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STUDENT ARTICLE
Is State Law Looking for Trouble?:
The Federal Arbitration Act Flexes its
Preemptive Muscle
I. INTRODUCTION
This article begins with an overview of the preemption concept as it affects
the American legal system. The source of preemption power is revealed and the
most common forms of preemption are introduced. Next, the article discusses
preemption and its interaction with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The dis-
cussion begins with a chronological view of the cases that have defined the effects
the FAA has on arbitration agreements via its preemption power and ends with a
summary of the current state of the law.
Following the general FAA preemption discussion, the article explores spe-
cific and current issues within the subject matter. The FAA's effect on classwide
arbitration is analyzed in situations where class action is and is not addressed in
the arbitration agreement. Next, state contract defenses against arbitration agree-
ments are examined. Specifically, the article addresses the current approaches
courts are taking regarding defenses such as severability of arbitration clauses,
mutuality of obligations, and unconscionability when facing the FAA's preemp-
tion power. Thirdly, the article addresses the effect of FAA preemption in the
contentious area of franchise agreement arbitration clauses. This section of the
article explores the legal foundation for preemption in the franchise context and
discusses preemption of such agreements in regard to the agreements' validity, the
use of forum selection clauses in such agreements, and providing for attorney's
fees in such agreements. Finally, the interplay between the FAA and state arbitra-
tion rules, as found in the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA), is examined.
Specifically, the article discusses the issues the RUAA's drafters considered in
order to avoid FAA preemption problems.
II. PREEMPTION GENERALLY
Federal laws may preempt state laws because the Framers proclaimed the
United States Constitution to be the supreme law of the nation.' From its elevated
position, the Constitution allows Congress to create statutes, within its Constitu-
tional authority, that nullify state law contrary to those statutes.2 Congress does
I. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl.2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
2. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, c1.18. An exception emerges when the federal government attempts to
preempt the power of a state that is expressly designated to the states by the U.S. Constitution. See
1
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not possess the substantive power to preempt state laws, thus the power must
emanate from enumerated constitutional powers and the Supremacy Clause, which
legitimizes congressional authority to enact preempting laws.
3
The Tenth Amendment reserves powers not given to the federal government
for the people and individual states. 4 The Amendment is considered by some as a
truism in that it merely pronounces that "all is retained which has not been surren-
dered."5 However, the message delivered by its text contributes to the policy
behind the judiciary's maxim that "the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress." 6 Moreover, the Amendment precludes the federal govern-
ment from requiring states to govern in accordance with federal instructions.7
"Congress may not simply 'commandeer the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program'.
8
Although instructed governance is prohibited, state courts must comply with fed-
eral preemption.
When a state law is preempted, state judiciaries must enforce the superior fed-
eral law as if they were a federal court.9 The Supreme Court has stated:
Federal law is enforceable in state courts not because Congress has de-
termined that federal courts would otherwise be burdened or that state
courts might provide a more convenient forum - although both might
well be true - but because the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it
are as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature.
10
Perpich v. Dep't of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 351 (1990) (explaining that if a state were in need of its
State Guard due to a local emergency, the federal government's order that removed the troops for
federal purposes could be vetoed by the state governor).
3. Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2091 (2000). "[Tlhe
Supremacy Clause itselfd[id] not authorize Congress to preempt state laws ... [it] prescribed a consti-
tutional choice of law rule ... giv[ing] federal law precedence over conflicting state law." Id. at 2088.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The relationship between the Supremacy Clause and the Tenth
Amendment can be characterized as follows:
Preemption of state laws ... speaks to the effect of these state legislative and executive actions
from the script written in the Supremacy Clause. The difference is akin to not having a will of
one's own, as opposed to having the free exercise of one's will but subject to correction within
specified parameters. The former is protected by the Tenth Amendment, and the latter is pre-
scribed by the Supremacy Clause.
Dinh, supra note 3, at 2095.
5. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
124 (1941)).
6. Dinh, supra note 3, at 2097 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). Al-
though federal preemption power of state laws is evident, coexistence can occur between federal and
state law on the same subject. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 713-14 (1985). "[l]n the application of this principle of supremacy of an act of Congress in a case
where the State law is but the exercise of a reserved power, the repugnance or conflict should be direct
and positive, so that the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand together." Lincoln Fed.
Labor Union No. 19129 v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 31 N.W.2d 477, 487 (Neb. 1948).
7. New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 466 (3d Cir. 1996).
8. Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (citations omitted)).
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It is established that the United States Supreme Court has set forth tests for
determining whether federal law should preempt state law. "When considering
pre-emption, we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.""
There are three well-accepted methods by which federal law preempts.'2 The
most straight forward method is labeled express or explicit preemption, which
occurs when Congress exhibits a "clear and manifest ... purpose to displace con-
current state law-a requirement that is amply met by an express preemption
clause given traditional primacy of statutory text in interpretation."'' 3  Another
method, identified as field preemption, transpires when the federal regulation is:
[S]o pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it, if the Act of Congress ... touch[es]
a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same sub-
ject, or if the goals sought to be obtained and the obligations imposed re-
veal a purpose to preclude state authority. '
4
Conflict preemption is the final commonly accepted method of federal
preemption.' 5 Here, preemption occurs when "compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility or when a state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress."'
' 6
1I. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991).
12. Id. at 604-05.
13. Dinh, supra note 3, at 2101. The court's duty here is not examining constitutional law, specifi-
cally the Supremacy Clause, but is statutory interpretation. ld. at 2100.
14. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 605 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court, when considering whether the
statute occupies the field, "look[s] to the federal statute itself, read in the light of its constitutional
setting and its legislative history." DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 n.8 (1976).
15. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 605.
16. Id. (citations omitted). In an effort to determine whether sufficient inconsistency exists, the
court stated:
Congressional enactments that do not exclude all state legislation in [sic] same field nevertheless
override state laws with which they conflict. The criterion for determining whether state and
federal laws are [sic] so inconsistent that the state law must give way is firmly established in our
decisions. Our task is to determine whether under the circumstances of this particular case, (the
State's) law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. This inquiry requires us to consider the relationship between state and
federal laws as they are interpreted and applied, not merely as they are written.
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977) (citations omitted). The three primary classi-
fications are further subdivided into five categories by Professor Dinh of Georgetown University Law
Center. Dinh, supra note 3, at 2100. The professor similarly describes express, conflict and field
preemption while adding obstacle and dormant commerce clause categories. Id. at 2100-13. The first
additional category, obstacle preemption, also known as frustration of purpose, preempts a "state law.
. if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." Id. at 2098-99. Obstacle preemption limits conflict preemption application to situations
where impossibility exists due to the dual existence of laws. Id. at 2104. The final category is dormant
commerce clause preemption. Id. at 2109. "[S]tate laws that discriminate against or otherwise burden
interstate commerce can be displaced after judicial scrutiny even in the absence of any relevant con-
gressional action." Id. Thus, the courts must interpret Congressional silence. Id at 2109-10. The
endeavor of interpreting Congressional language has proven sufficiently difficult. "[T]o determine
No. 2]
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A test for determining whether a federal statute preempts a state statute is as
follows:
An attorney or court should ask ... whether Congress, in enacting the
federal statute, intended to exercise its constitutionally delegated author-
ity to set aside the laws of a state; if so, the supremacy clause requires the
court to follow federal, not state, law. If explicit preemption language
does not appear in the federal statute or does not directly answer the
question whether Congress intended to exercise its authority to set aside
state law, then a court that is determining whether the federal law pre-
empts the state law must consider whether the federal statute's structure
and purpose, or nonspecific statutory language, reveal clear, but implicit,
pre-emptive intent.17
Preemption becomes more controversial when applied to specific subjects
such as arbitration, which are already surrounded by controversial issues other
than preemption.
III. FAA PREEMPTION
Congress created the FAA in 1925 to overrule common law that nullified ar-
bitration agreements.18 In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Co.,' 9 Flood & Conklin (Flood) entered into a consulting agreement with Prima
Paint (Prima) in which Flood would provide advice and consultation with regard
to Prima's trade sales accounts.2 0  The agreement contained a broad arbitration
clause in which parties agreed that any dispute that may arise from the agreement
would be settled by arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation. 2 1 Prima later notified attorneys for Flood that their client had committed
fraud; Prima alleged that Flood misrepresented its solvency during the initial con-
tracting phase, while the company actually intended to file for bankruptcy.
22
what Congress means when it has said nothing at all is impossible." Id. at 2110 (quoting Daniel A.
Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST. COMM. 395, 395-96 (1986)).
Analysis of the final category has been approached through two avenues. Id. at 2109. First, it is fed-
eral common law analysis. Id. Dinh states that:
The Court identifies a uniquely federal interest in maintaining national unity and uniformity in
interstate economic regulation and fashions a common law rule to the extent necessary to further
those interests. It then compares competing state laws to the federal common law rule to deter-
mine the level of conflict with the federal interests and policy.
Id. at 2110. The second analysis "can be seen as a variation on field and obstacle preemption ....
[when] [t]he field is interstate commerce." Id. at 2111. If the state law is "an obstacle to the general
purpose" of regulating interstate commerce "or fall[s] within the regulated field," then it is preempted.
Id.
17. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 53 (2002) (citing Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v.
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) on remand to, 84 F.3d 1401 (1 1th Cir. 1996): Conference of Fed. Say. and
Loan Assoc. v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979) qff'd, 445 U.S. 921 (1980)).
18. Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925).
19. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
20. Id. at 397.
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Flood served on Prima a "notice of intention to arbitrate" the dispute.23 Soon
thereafter, Prima filed suit in a federal district court, invoking diversity jurisdic-
tion.24 Prima sought rescission of the entire consulting agreement based on
fraudulent inducement, and also sought an order to enjoin Flood from proceeding
with arbitration. In response, Flood filed a motion to stay litigation pending
arbitration, which was granted by the District Court.26 The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals dismissed Prima's appeal, holding that the FAA governed the contract
in question due to its affect on interstate commerce. The Second Circuit came to
this decision despite the U.S. Supreme Court's prior holding in Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins,27 which declared that federal courts hearing cases under diversity juris-
diction must apply state substantive law. Prima eventually obtained certiorari
from the Supreme Court.28
The Supreme Court held that, for cases within federal courts, the FAA is a
body of substantive law that will govern arbitration agreements that are included
in a transaction that involves interstate commerce. 29 The Court held that this deci-
sion was neither a violation of the Erie doctrine nor a violation of the U.S. Consti-
tution, because the FAA is an appropriate exercise of the Congressional power
under the Commerce Clause. 30 Therefore, the Court decided that it was unable to
review arguments regarding fraudulent inducement of the contract generally.31
Because there was no claim that the arbitration agreement itself was fraudulently
induced, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Prima's appeal.32
This holding erased doubt as to whether the Act would govern diversity cases in
federal courts for contracts falling within the gambit of the statute.33
Other notable implications came from the opinion in Prima Paint include the
Supreme Court's broadening of what constitutes "commerce" under Section 2 of
the FAA.34 Additionally, it can be implied that the majority rejected Justice
Black's dissenting opinion, which called for the FAA to apply only to "contracts
between merchants for the interstate shipment of goods." 35 Also, though the
Court did not explicitly say that arbitration agreements are "severable" from the
contracts in which they are included, it stated that federal courts may not review
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 398-99.
26. Id. at 399.
27. See 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
28. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 395.
29. Id. at 400. (stating that Section 4 of the FAA provides a statutory remedy for a party seeking to
compel arbitration pursuant to a valid agreement that involves a transaction involving interstate com-
merce). 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000), which states, in pertinent part:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written
agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for such
agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28 ... for an order directing that such arbitration
proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.
Id.
30. Prima Paint, 388 U.S at 404-05.
31. Id. at 406.
32. Id.
33. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 14.2 (1999).
34. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at411.
35. Id. at 401 (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 200-01 (1956) (which applied a
fairly narrow definition of "commerce").
No. 21
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claims regarding the contract as a whole but may only review claims regarding the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement.36 This holding broadened the scope of
the Act, causing it to be applicable to many types of agreements which were not
theretofore covered, and created some confusion in state courts as to which law to
apply. 37  Also, this decision paved the way for future decisions that held the FAA
applicable in state and federal courts, although not expressly stated in the instant
holding.
38
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. ,39 Mer-
cury Construction Corporation (Mercury) entered into a contract with the Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital (Moses) to provide construction of additions to the
hospital. 40 According to an arbitration clause in the contract, any disagreements
that were decided by the architect or that were not decided within a specific time
were required to be submitted for binding arbitration, unless both parties agreed
otherwise.41 A dispute arose due to unresolved claims and failure to make pay-
ments, and Moses filed suit in state court, in part seeking a declaratory judgment
that there was no right to arbitration.42 Mercury, invoking diversity jurisdiction,
filed a separate action in Federal District Court requesting an order to compel
arbitration pursuant to Section 4 of the FAA.43 The federal court stayed the suit
pending resolution of the state court suit because the two claims involved the
identical issue of whether the claims should be submitted for arbitration. 44 Mer-
cury appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals through two avenues45-a
notice of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,46 and a petition for mandamus under 28
U.S.C. § 165 1. 4  The Court of Appeals eventually reversed the District Court
decision, holding that a grant of an order staying litigation is an immediately ap-
pealable final order and that the District Court abused its discretion in granting the
stay, and remanded the case with instructions to compel arbitration.48
Agreeing with the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the order of
the District Court was final and immediately appealable because the appellant was
36. Id. at 403-04.
37. See Tennessee River Pulp & Paper Co. v. Eichleay Corp., 637 S.W.2d 853 (Tenn. 1982) (hold-
ing state courts must recognize and apply the FAA to contracts involving interstate commerce).
38. MACNEIL, supra note 33 at § 14.2.1(3).
39. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
40. Id. at 4.
41. Id. at 4-5.
42. Id at 6-7.
43. Id. Prior to filing suit, Moses obtained an ex parte injunction from the state court which prohib-
ited Mercury from taking steps toward arbitration, but the injunction was dissolved as soon as Mercury
received notice and objected. Id. at 7.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 8.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (stating that "[t]he courts of appeals (other than the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States").
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000). Also known as the All Writs Act, it states, "The Supreme Court and
all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
48. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 8, The Court of Appeals failed to reach the mandamus issue, which
is an extraordinary remedy, because it was able to exercise ordinary appellate jurisdiction over final
orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id. at 9.
[Vol. 2003
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effectively barred from judicial resolution of the claims.49 The Supreme Court
also affirmed the Court of Appeals decision that the stay of litigation by the Dis-
trict Court was an abuse of discretion, as there was more progress in the federal
action and no other "exceptional circumstances" were found to abstain from de-
ciding the appeal.50 Regarding arbitrability of the claims, the Supreme Court
found another reason to rule against the District Court's stay. Relying on its deci-
sion in Prima Paint, the Court reiterated that Section 2 of the Act was a declara-
tion by Congress of a strong policy in favor of arbitration, and that this federal law
was applicable to the agreement. 51 For the first time, the Court declared "any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration." 52 The Court finally noted that the state court probably would not
adequately protect Mercury's rights, because although "state courts, as much as
federal courts, are obliged to grant stays of litigation under § 3," this would leave
Moses at the mercy of Mercury, the party owing payment and the party opposing
arbitration, because there would be no order compelling Mercury to comply with
the agreement.
5 3
The major impact of the instant case was the Court's clear declaration of a
strong policy in favor of arbitration, and its decidedly pro-arbitration interpreta-
tion of the FAA. It also reaffirmed Prima Paint by stating that while the FAA
does not create any independent federal subject matter jurisdiction, it is still a
body of federal substantive law that provides a federal remedy to those wishing to
compel other parties to honor arbitration agreements.5 4 However, in this decision,
the Court first announced that the federal courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction of
the FAA with state courts, and mentioned that in some instances, the FAA will
govern state court proceedings.5 5 This opened up the idea that at least some of the
provisions of the Act could be applicable in state court proceedings.
In Southland Corporation v. Keating,56 several franchisees entered into
agreements with Southland Corporation in order to obtain 7-Eleven stores.
5 7
Southland's standard franchise agreement required arbitration of any controversy
or claim arising from agreement, according to the American Arbitration Associa-
tion's rules.58 Keating sued in a class action against Southland for fraud, misrep-
resentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the California Franchise
49. Id. at 10. The Court noted that the District Court rationalized its order to stay litigation because
the federal suit involved the same issue as the separate state action. Id. Since the issue of arbitrability
was the only substantive issue that the federal court could review, once the state court had made a
decision, its judgment would be resjudicata and would effectively bar federal judicial decision. Id.
50. Id. at 22-23.
51. Id. at24.
52. Id. at 24-25.
53. Id. at 26-27. The Court stated that it was not clear whether or not state courts could compel
arbitration pursuant to Section 4, so a mere stay of litigation could possibly result in an eventual claim
within federal courts under Section 4 to compel compliance. Id. at 26. The Court felt this would
frustrate the intent of the FAA, which was to provide quick resolution of claims prescribed by the Act.
Id. at 27.
54. Id. at 26.
55. Id. at 25-26.
56. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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Investment Law (FIL).59 Southland petitioned the California Superior Court to
compel arbitration of the cases; the court granted Southland's motion except for
the claims based on the FIL.6 ° Southland appealed this portion of the decision.6'
Eventually the California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision
holding that the claims asserted under the FIL were not subject to arbitration and
that the FIL was not preempted by the FAA as it was not conflicting law.
62
The Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme Court's decision, hold-
ing that the statutory claims were subject to arbitration.63 California's requirement
that the FIL required a judicial resolution was deemed to be in conflict with the
FAA and therefore preempted due to the Supremacy Clause.64 The Supreme
Court relied on prior decisions in Prima Paint6 5 and Moses H. Cone Memorial
HospitalP6 in affirming that the FAA creates a body of federal substantive law. 67 It
determined that due to Congressional Commerce Clause powers68 under which the
Act was created, the FAA is applicable in state as well as federal courts.6 9 Look-
ing to and interpreting legislative history, the court stated that it was Congress'
intent to create a substantive rule under the Commerce Clause that would be ap-
plicable in state and federal courts, and would preclude state laws that attempted
to "undercut" enforcement of arbitration agreements. 70 The Supreme Court finally
declined to address the issue of whether the FAA precludes class action arbitration
because this issue was not opposed on federal grounds, leaving the Court without
jurisdiction to review. 71
The Supreme Court's decision in Southland explicitly declared that the FAA
was applicable in state courts, and reaffirmed the notion that the FAA is substan-
tive law that will preempt conflicting state law. The Court also noted that state
public policy defenses that attempt to interfere with arbitration procedures would
not stand.72 However, due to Section 2 of the FAA, state substantive laws regard-
59. Id. See California Franchise Investment Law, CAL.CORP.CODE § 31000 et seq. (West 1977).
60. Southland 465 U.S. at 4. A section within the FIL rendered void any provision in an agreement
to bind a franchisee to waive compliance with any provision of the FIL. CAL.CORP.COD § 31512
(preempted by Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393 (2003)). As interpreted by the
California Supreme Court, the statute required judicial consideration of claims brought under this
statute, and therefore refused to compel arbitration. Id. at 10.
61. Id. at 4.
62. Id. at 5.
63. Id. at 17.
64. Id. at 16. The Supremacy Clause is found at U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
65. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
66. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
67. Southland, 465 U.S. at I 1-12.
68. U.S. CONST. art I § 8, cl. 3.
69. Southland, 465 U.S. at 12. The Court examined legislative history of the FAA and determined
that it was Congress' intent to give the Act a very broad reach, due in large part to Section 2's provi-
sion that the Act would apply to transactions "involving commerce." Id. at 13. However, Justice 0'
Connor's dissent explicitly rejects the majority's view; she believes the majority misinterpreted
Congressional intent and that the FAA was intended only to apply in federal courts. Id. at 14, 21-26.
70. Id. at 13-16.
71. Id. at 9 (applying 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2)). Of course, this issue rose in later litigation, most nota-
bly in the recent case of Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S.Ct. 2402 (2003).
72. Id at 16, n.11.
[Vol. 2003
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ing general contract defenses are applicable, regardless of the forum of the suit.
73
As the scope of the Act was being broadened, the Court provided more justifica-
tion for its decision from legislative history while specifically addressing areas
that are left to state substantive law,74 perhaps as a response to strong dissenting
opinions which argued that state substantive laws and state public policy argu-
ments were erroneously disregarded.75
The FAA gained considerable preemption power after the Supreme Court de-
cided Southland. The Court found it was "Congressional intent to place arbitra-
tion agreements upon the same footing as other contracts. ' 76 In Southland, the
Court "explicitly held that the FAA applied in both federal and state courts...
[and] preempted state statutes that invalidated arbitration agreements.,
77
In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Leland Stanford Junior University, Stan-
ford University entered into a standardized construction contract with Volt Infor-
mation Sciences. 78 The contract contained an agreement to arbitrate any disputes
arising therefrom. 79 The contract also contained a "choice-of-law" clause, stating
that the parties agreed that the contract would be governed by the law of "the
place where the Project is located., 80  A dispute arose, and Volt formally de-
manded arbitration. 81 The University filed suit in California Superior Court, and
also sought indemnity from two parties that were not involved in the construction
contract. 82 Volt petitioned the court to compel arbitration pursuant to the agree-
ment, and the University responded by moving for a stay of arbitration. 83 In mov-
ing for a stay of arbitration, the University relied on the California Arbitration
Act, which provided that a court could stay arbitration pending the resolution of
related litigation between a party subject to the arbitration agreement in question
73. Id. However, these contract law defenses may only be used if they are applicable to contracts
generally, therefore state laws that contain provisions only applicable to arbitration agreements would
not meet Section 2's scope. Id.
74. Id. at 15-16.
75. Id.
76. Donald E. Johnson, Has Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson Exterminated Alabama's Anti-
Arbitration Rule?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 577, 587 (1996).
77. James Zimmerman, Restrictions on Forum-Selection Clauses in Franchise Agreements and the
Federal Arbitration Act: Is State Law Preempted? 51 VAND. L. REV. 759, 764 (1998). "The South-
land [sic] Court noted that there exist 'only two limitations on the enforceability of arbitration provi-
sions governed by the Federal Arbitration Act: they must be part of a written maritime contract or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce and such clauses may be revoked upon grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' Johnson, supra note 76, at 590 (cita-
tions omitted).




82. Id. at 470-71. The parties not involved in the construction agreement were not bound by the
arbitration agreement and were free to litigate their similar claims. Id at 471-72.
83. Id. at 471.
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and those who were not bound.8 4 The Superior Court granted the motion to stay
arbitration, and a California appellate court affirmed.
Upon appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Volt argued that it had a federally
protected right to compel arbitration, and that the choice of law provision could
not act as a waiver of this right.86 The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
explaining that Section 4 of the FAA does not give an absolute right to compel
arbitration in all circumstances, but rather confers the "right to obtain an order
directing that 'arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the parties']
agreement."' 87 By choosing California law, the parties agreed that arbitration
would not proceed in the situations described within California's arbitration stat-
ute.
88
The Supreme Court found that federal law did not preempt the state statute in
this case because the parties agreed that California law would govern, and the
state law allowing for the stay was not contrary to the goals and policies of the
FAA.89 Although the contract did fall within the jurisdiction of the Act, and the
FAA has no similar provision that permits a court to stay arbitration pending reso-
lution of related litigation, the Court nonetheless did not preempt state law. 90 The
Court held that the choice-of-law clause required California rules of arbitration to
be applied despite the seemingly negative effects the law had on speedy arbitrabil-
ity of claims.9' The Court also rejected appellant's argument that preemption was
appropriate because the law contravened the strong federal policy in favor of arbi-
tration. 92 The Court stated that "[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration
under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the
enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate." 93 If
the Court had made the determination that the law was an obstacle to the intent of
the FAA, then federal law could have preempted this decision.
94
In this decision, the Court offered some protection to state court interpreta-
tions regarding choice of law provisions within arbitration clauses, affirming that
this avenue is safe from preemption once a threshold determination is made that
the state law doesn't conflict with the FAA. This decision created a limitation on
the Court's decision in Southland, as well as a showing that federal policy favor-
ing arbitration would not preempt in every situation. Southland also left open the
84. Id. at 471 n13 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1281(c) (West 1982), which states:
When a court determines that "[a] party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending
court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction ... and
there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact ... the court ....
may stay arbitration pending the outcome of the court action or special proceeding.").
85. Id. at 471.
86. Id. at 474.
87. Id. at 474-75 (emphasis in original). See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
88. Volt, 489 U.S. at 475.
89. Id. at 476-77.
90. See id.
91. Id
92. Id. at 475.
93. Id. at 476.
94. See id. at 477.
[Vol. 2003
10
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2003, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2003/iss2/9
Is State Law Looking for Trouble?
distinct possibility of lack of uniformity among the states in determining the en-
forceability of similar arbitration clauses.95
In Volt, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress did not intend to occupy
the entire field of arbitration; therefore, conflict preemption must apply instead.96
This holding added to the inherent confusion created by Southland97 and ham-
pered already struggling lower courts' ability to decide preemption cases involv-
ing the FAA.98
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,9 9 the Supreme Court was faced
with the question of how broad the scope of the jurisdictional requirement of the
FAA would reach. 00 The Dobsons commenced a lawsuit against Allied-Bruce for
allegedly failing to remove termites and for declaring that a house they inspected
was free from infestation.'0 ' Allied-Bruce moved for a stay of proceedings based
on an arbitration clause in the initial service contract with the Dobsons.' °2 How-
ever, a state statute invalidated any written, pre-dispute arbitration agreements,
0 3
and the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the lower court's denial of the stay based
on the state law.1 0°4 The FAA was passed pursuant to Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause, and the statute contains a jurisdictional provision in Section 2
whin states that the statute will only apply to contracts "evidencing a transaction
involving commerce."' 05 "Involving commerce" is defined in Section 1 as "com-
merce among the several States or with foreign nations."' 0 6 The transaction in
question was primarily local, despite the fact that Allied-Bruce was involved in
95. One treatise states the thought that parties who are subject to arbitration often attempt to avoid
honoring their agreement by involving third parties in a similar litigation. PHILIP L. BRUNER &
PATRICK J. O' CONNER, JR., BRUNER AND O'CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 20:12 (May 2003).
96. 489 U.S. at 477.
97. Johnson, supra note 76 at 588. The author stated, "[T]he argument against FAA application in
state courts has been persuasively supported. In fact, the first time that any court even suggested that
the FAA applied in state courts occurred nearly thirty-five years after the enactment of the FAA." Id.
Dissenting in Southland, Justice O'Conner stated that arbitration is procedural rather than substantive
and cited legislative history of the FAA which stated, "Whether an agreement for arbitration shall be
enforced or not is a question of procedure." Id. (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I, 25
(1984)). The fact that the FAA is now considered substantive is arguably in violation of the Erie
doctrine. Id. at 585. The FAA was enacted before Erie, when Congress could create substantive rules
for diversity cases contrary to those of states. Id. at 585-86. The Court bypassed Erie difficulties by
declaring that because Congress referenced the Commerce Clause when creating the FAA, "Congress
obviously intended that the FAA apply in both state and federal courts." Id. at 587.
98. See Brief for Respondent, 2003 WL 1701513, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S.Ct. 2402
(2003) (No. 02-634) (citing Ting v. AT&T Techs. Inc., 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Bradley v.
Harris Research, 275 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2001); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., 24 Cal.
4th 83 (2000); KKW Enters. v. Gloria Jean's Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d 42, 50 (1st
Cir. 1999); Doctors Assocs. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1998)); Graham v. Scissor Tail,
Inc., 28 Cal.3d 807 (1981).
99. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
100. See 9 U.S.C. § 4.
101. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 268-69.
102. Id. at 269. Allied-Bruce also pointed to Section 2 of the FAA in requesting the stay. See 9
U.S.C. § 2.
103. See ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1993).
104. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 269. See ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3).
105. 9 U.S.C. § 2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the exclusive power to regulate
commerce among the states).
106. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
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some interstate commerce activities, and the lower court held that the involvement
in interstate commerce was too slight.1
0 7
On appeal, the parties stipulated that the transaction involved interstate com-
merce. 10 8 At the time of entering the agreement, appellants argued, they did not
contemplate that the transaction would be anything but local. 10 9 The Supreme
Court reversed the state court's decision, applying the FAA as governing law."
0
The Act has a broad reach, the Court concluded, relying on precedent which ex-
tended the Act's applicability to the same extent of Congress' Commerce Clause
power.' The Court refused to overrule Southland, which held generally that the
FAA is applicable in state courts when contracts fall within its jurisdiction, and
that inconsistent state law will be preempted by the FAA." 1
2
Relying on prior case law, as well as an examination of the FAA's language,
legislative history, and purpose, the Court concluded that the federal statute
should reach as broadly as the Commerce Clause.' " In other words, for the FAA
to apply to a contract the transaction need only involve interstate commerce as an
end result, also called the "commerce-in-fact" test, regardless of whether or not
parties to the contract contemplated at any time that commerce would be af-
fected."14 The Court rejected the "contemplation of the parties" test, holding that
it would place arbitration agreements on unequal status with other contracts, and
was therefore preempted by the FAA.' '5 The Court reiterated that states may not
decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all of its terms except for the arbi-
tration clause.' 16
The Court was primarily concerned with interpreting Section 2's language
rather than in reexamining the expansive view of the FAA declared in Southland.
The instant decision also had the effect of eliminating the option of many states to
invalidate arbitration agreements that were against public policy, such as clauses
within employment or consumer contracts. 17
In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,118 once again the Supreme Court
was placed in the position of reviewing a Montana state court decision. A dispute
arose between Doctor's Associates, Inc. and Paul Casarotto, a franchisee for the
operation of a Subway sandwich shop in Montana. 19 The standard form franchise
agreement that the parties entered into contained an arbitration clause. 120 After
107. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 269.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 269.
110. Id. at 282.
Ill. Id. at 274. The court relied on Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I (1984) (holding that the
FAA preempts state laws which invalidate arbitration agreements); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (holding that the Act is "based upon and confined to the incon-
testable federal foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and over admiralty"').
112. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 271.
113. Id. at 273-74.
114. Id. at 277.
115. Id. at 281.
116. Id.
117. Section 2 of the FAA would preempt state laws that attempt to exclude employment and con-
sumer contracts from containing enforceable arbitration agreements. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
118. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
119. Id. at 682.
120. Id. at 683.
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Casarotto filed suit against Doctor's Associates, Inc., the state court stayed the
lawsuit pending arbitration because of the arbitration clause., 2' The Montana
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the clause was not enforceable because it
failed to meet a state "notice requirement" which mandated that arbitration clauses
be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of contract. 22 Interpreting
Volt, the Montana Supreme Court felt that the prior decision qualified the South-
land holding and limited the preemptive force of Section 2.123 The state court felt
the language of Section 2 should not be the focus, but whether the application of
the Montana statute would undermine the FAA's goals and policies.' 24 The Mon-
tana Court reasoned that the purpose of the FAA was not to impose arbitration on
those who did not voluntarily consent.' 25 It felt that Montana state law did not
undermine the FAA, and presumed the United States Supreme Court would con-
cur. 126 The Montana court reaffirmed its original ruling, even in light of the Su-
preme Court decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson 127 after which this
appeal occurred. 1
28
The U.S. Supreme Court stated that the Montana Supreme Court had misin-
terpreted Volt. 129 The state rule examined in Volt did not affect the enforceability
of the arbitration agreement itself, but merely delayed the arbitration proceedings
while a similar lawsuit progressed.13) In the instant case, however, Montana's
statute would have invalidated the clause entirely.'13  State contract law defenses
may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without the general threat of
federal preemption. 32 However, state laws that are applicable only to arbitration
provisions will be preempted by the FAA if they are found within contracts that
fall under the FAA's broad jurisdiction. 33 The Supreme Court declared that this
was true, regardless of whether a state law that singled out arbitration agreements
was consistent with the general goals and policies of the FAA. 134 To single out
121. Id.
122. Id. at 684. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1994) (repealed 1997) ("Notice that a
contract is subject to arbitration pursuant to this chapter shall be typed in underlined capital letters on
the first page of the contract; and unless such notice is displayed thereon, the contract may not be
subject to arbitration.")).
123. id. at 685. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 938 (1994).
124. Casarotto, 886 P.2d at 938. The Court relied on language from Volt, which stated, "The ques-
tion before us, therefore, is whether application of [state law] to stay arbitration under this contract in
interstate commerce, in accordance with the terms of the arbitration agreement itself, would undermine
the goals and policies of the FAA." Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-78. See also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (stating that an
arbitration agreement is "valid irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract," when federal law applies).
125. Casarotto, 886 P.2d at 938-39.
126. Id. The statute's apparent purpose was merely to protect parties with less bargaining power from
agreeing to arbitrate without proper notice, which is consistent with the view of the FAA that the
Montana Supreme Court relied upon.
127. 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995).
128. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995), rev'd, Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
129. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 687. However, interpretation of state contract law defenses and the manner in which they
are applied can also pose problems. See infra Part V.
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arbitration clauses for exclusion would place the clauses in suspect status and on
an unequal level to other contracts, which is a view inconsistent with the purpose
of the FAA.'35 The decision in Doctor's Associates, Inc., further limited state
courts' ability to preserve their public policy defenses to arbitration.
36
Currently, the FAA's preemptive power is expansive. It applies to nearly all
contracts and can be divided into two basic types of preemption. 37 First, state
laws that "thwart parties' attempts to arbitrate" are preempted by the FAA.
38
Second, "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration."' 139 The second and more troubling type has
unsettled limitations. 140 Federal policy's favor of arbitration leads to preemption
only if the state law disfavors arbitration, yet leaves the states free to "take the
lead in fashioning" improvements to the arbitration process. 14 1 The FAA does not
displace state contract rules; instead, because it allows the language of contracts to
identify the disputes subject to arbitration, it modifies "state contract rules ... to
further the Act's 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.""
142
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA's preemption power leaves
lower courts to struggle with, inter alia, whether the FAA applies when there is
state law regarding procedures, such as classwide arbitration, and if so, whether
the FAA precludes classwide arbitration as a procedure for settling disputes.
Much of the argument should hinge on whether such arbitration disfavors or fa-
vors arbitration agreements and whether the contract providing for typical arbitra-
tion is interpreted to allow classwide arbitration.
IV. CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION
The most current Supreme Court case involving classwide arbitration was re-
cently decided. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to a South Carolina Su-
preme Court decision that determined an arbitration agreement, silent on the mat-
ter, was not improperly interpreted to require classwide arbitration as the method
for dispute resolution. 143 The agreement between Green Tree and Bazzle, while
not mentioning class arbitration, did provide that South Carolina law would apply
135. Id. at 687.
136. However, public policy arguments may be resurfacing in the manner in which state courts apply
general contract law defenses such as lack of mutuality and unconscionability. See infra Part V.
137. Note, An Unnecessary Choice of Law: Volt, Mastrobuono, and Federal Arbitration Act Preemp-
tion, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2250, 2253-56 (2002).
138. Id. at 2254.
139. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24 (1983)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2254-55.
142. Id. at 2255-56 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991)).
143. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360-62 (S.C. 2002), vacated by, 123 S. Ct.
2402 (2003). The court decided the contract for arbitration was ambiguous, therefore it applied contra
proferentum, "[a]mbiguous language in a contract ... should be construed liberally and interpreted
strongly in favor of the non-drafting party." Id. The court acknowledged the split of authority among
federal and state courts on whether classwide arbitration was allowed under the FAA absent express
contractual authorization, but noted that federal court decisions barring such proceedings were based
largely on Section 4 of the Act, which by its terms does not apply to state courts. Id. The court further
reasoned, "If we enforced a mandatory adhesive arbitration clause, but prohibited class actions in
arbitration where the agreement is silent, the drafting party could effectively prevent class actions
against it without having to say it was doing so." Id.
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to any legal action.' 44 The law of South Carolina permits classwide arbitrations
like the one ordered by the arbitrator.145 Also in favor of classwide arbitration, the
arbitration agreements that the remaining class members signed, contained and
were deficient in the same language regarding classwide arbitration as Bazzle's
agreement. 46 Moreover, the typical prerequisites were present to warrant class-
action certification in accordance with South Carolina rules of civil procedure.
47
Although Green Tree did not focus on preemption in the lower courts, while
in front of the Supreme Court of the United States, it argued that the FAA pre-
empts arbitration agreements silent as to classwide proceedings. 148  The Court
decided in a plurality decision to vacate the judgment and remand it for further
proceedings. 49  Four members of the plurality fashioned the issue as whether
contracts such as those at issue are silently approving classwide arbitration or
whether they are silently forbidding classwide arbitration.' 50  In so framing the
issue, the Court quietly indicated there was no preemption.'' Therefore, the plu-
rality decided the FAA did not preempt the lower court's decision to allow class-
wide arbitration and it concluded the decision should have been made by the arbi-
trator as the parties had agreed.
52
The plurality listed the scenarios where the decision was one for a judge
rather than an arbitrator 53 and then determined the facts of the instant case were
not analogous to those on the list.'5 4  Opposite to the dissent, infra, the plurality
compared Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.' 55 and First Options of Chi-
cago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 56 and found that Howsam controlled.' 57 The question, ac-
cording to the plurality, was what kind of arbitration was agreed upon rather than




147. Id. at *11. There were approximately 3,600 arbitration agreements like Bazzle's. Id. The "fac-
tual questions at stake" from the cases of the members of the class and Bazzle were alike. Id. No
potential for conflicts of interest existed among the members of the class. Id.
148. Petitioner's Brief at *3, 2003 WL 721716, Green Tree (No. 02-634). "[T]he FAA does not
permit class-action mechanisms to be superimposed onto private arbitration agreements absent the
parties' consent."
149. See Green Tree, 123 S.Ct. 2402.
150. Id. at 2404.
151. Id. at 2408. The Court stated its purpose in taking the case was to determine if the lower court's
holding was consistent with the FAA, but offered no discussion of the matter. Id. at 2404.
152. Petitioner's Brief at *14, 2003 WL 721716, Green Tree (No. 02-634). Justice Stevens concurred
in the judgment and dissented in part, noting that the agreement was silent; therefore, because the
challenge is directed at whether to conduct class arbitration and not at who made the decision, there is
no need to remand. Id. at 2408-09.
153. The court stated:
In certain limited circumstances, courts assume that the parties intended courts, not arbitrators, to
decide a particular arbitration-related matter (in the absence of "clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]" evi-
dence to the contrary). These limited instances typically involve matters of a kind that "contract-
ing parties would likely have expected a court" to decide. They include certain gateway matters,
such as whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all or whether a concededly
binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy.
Id. at 2407 (citations omitted).
154. Id.
155. 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
156. 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
157. Green Tree, 123 S.Ct. at 2407.
No. 2]
15
Hollis et al.: Hollis: Is State Law Looking for Trouble
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
whether they agreed to arbitrate.' 58 In conclusion, the plurality did not reach the
practical question begged by their holding-whether agreements containing lan-
guage that precludes classwide arbitration are hostile to arbitration thereby requir-
ing preemption by the FAA.
The dissenting justices would have reversed the South Carolina Supreme
Court.' 59 The dissenters viewed the issue not as one of contract interpretation, but
rather a question of which authority should make the decision. 60 "The decision of
what to submit to the arbitrator is a matter of contractual agreement by the parties,
and the interpretation of that contract is for the court, not for the arbitrator."'1
6
'
This approach, unlike the plurality, determined the FAA preempts when the con-
tract is silent. 62 The dissenters distinguished between procedural questions from
the dispute that should be decided by the arbitrator and questions of how the
agreement should be arbitrated. 163 Unlike the plurality, the dissenters concluded
that how an agreement should be arbitrated is more analogous to the question of
what should be arbitrated, which is a question for the courts.'
64
The dissenters found conflict between state and federal law, thus it concluded
the FAA must preempt. 65 The conflict was found where the Supreme Court of
South Carolina ignored the contract language requiring arbitration without a class,
thereby clashing with the FAA which allows the contract to fashion arbitration
according to state law. 166 The state court "imposed a regime that was contrary to
the express agreement of the parties as to how the arbitrator would be chosen."',
67
The dissenters also distinguished between silent contracts and those that specifi-
cally agree to allow classwide arbitration, in that if the contract had so provided,
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2408-12. Justice Thomas continued to stand firm that the FAA does not apply to state
court proceedings; therefore, the judgment could not be preempted. Id. at 2411.
160. Id. at 2408-12.
161. Id. at 2409. The court followed this statement reasoning from First Options:
Given the principle that a party can be forced to arbitrate only those issues it specifically has
agreed to submit to arbitration, one can understand why courts might hesitate to interpret silence
or ambiguity on the "who should decide arbitrability" point as giving the arbitrators that power,
for doing so might too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would
have thought a judge, not an arbitrator would decide.
First Options, 514 U.S. at 945.
162. Green Tree, 123 S.Ct. at 2409,
163. Id. at 2410. The dissenters compared Howsam and First Options. Id. at 2409. It concluded that
this case should be controlled by First Options. Id.
164, Id.
165. Id. at 2410. The court provided supporting law as follows:
"[T]he interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court
does not sit to review." But "state law may nonetheless be pre-empted to the extent that it actu-
ally conflicts with federal law - that is, to the extent that it 'stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' The parties do not
dispute that this contract falls within the coverage of the FAA. The "central purpose" of the FAA
is "to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms." In other
words, Congress sought simply to "place such agreements upon the same footing as other con-
tracts." This aim "requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate," in order to "give
effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties." "[A]s with any other contract, the
parties' intentions control." Under the FAA, "parties are generally free to structure their arbitra-
tion agreements as they see fit."
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2411.
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classwide arbitration would have been appropriate.' 68 The dissenters likewise left
the practical question unanswered. Entities implementing mandatory arbitration
clauses that wish to avoid classwide arbitration must now merely reword their
agreements to preclude classwide arbitration. The dissenters gave no indication
that such an agreement would be defeated by state contract defenses such as un-
conscionability. Given the issues avoided by the court, the practical significance
of the instant case is minimal.
California state courts reaffirmed their answer to the question of whether a
state court can order classwide arbitration if the case falls under the FAA. 69 Two
owners of Blue Cross health plans instigated classwide arbitration against Blue
Cross to which the company argued that each claim must be resolved through
binding arbitration consistent with the arbitration agreements. 70 After lower court
proceedings, the question remaining for the appellate court was whether the FAA
prohibits classwide arbitration under the circumstances.' 7
The court began its justification by touting California's use of classwide arbi-
tration in franchising contracts containing arbitration agreements.,72 It denounced
binding arbitration agreements appearing in adhesion contracts if the drafter may
insulate herself from class proceedings. 73 Next the court stated that consolidation
of arbitration proceedings is authorized in California civil procedure which bol-
sters the argument for classwide arbitration. 174 The court stated:
In these respects, an order for classwide arbitration in an adhesion con-
text would call for considerably less intrusion upon the contractual as-
pects of the relationship. The members of a class subject to classwide
arbitration would all be parties to an agreement with the party against
who their claim is asserted; each of those agreements would contain sub-
168. Id.
169. Blue Cross of Ca. v. Super. Ct., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
170. Id. There were two arbitration agreements containing the following language:
Any dispute between you and Blue Cross of California and/or its affiliates must be resolved by
binding arbitration, if the amount in dispute exceeds the jurisdictional limit of the Small Claims
Court. Any such dispute will be resolved not by law or resort to court process, except as Califor-
nia law provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings. Under this coverage, both you
and Blue Cross of California and its affiliates are giving up the right to have any dispute decided
in a court of law before a jury .... Any dispute or claim, of whatever nature, arising out of, in
connection with, or in relation to this Agreement or breach thereof, or in relation to care of deliv-
ery of care, including any claim based on contract, tort or statute, must be resolved by arbitration
if the amount sought exceeds the jurisdictional limit of the small claims court. Any disputes re-
garding a claim for damages within the jurisdictional limits of the small claims court will be re-
solved in such court. The arbitration is begun by the Member making written demand on Blue
Cross. The arbitration will be conducted by the American Arbitration Association according to
its commercial rules of arbitration. The arbitration shall be held in the state of California. The
Member and Blue Cross agree to be bound by the arbitration provision and acknowledge that
they are giving up their right to a trial by court or jury. The arbitration findings will be final and
binding except to the extent that California or Federal law provide for the judicial review of arbi-
tration proceeding.
Id.
171. Id. at 781-82. There was no dispute whether the provisions of the agreement fell under the FAA.
Id. The transactions clearly involved commerce. Id.
172. Id. at 785 (citing Keating v. Super. Ct., 31 Cal.3d 584 (Cal. 1982)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 785-86.
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stantially the same arbitration provision; and if any of the members of the
class were dissatisfied with the class representative, or with the choice of
arbitrator, or for any other reason would prefer to arbitrate on their own,
they would be free to opt out and do so. Moreover, the interests of jus-
tice that would be served by ordering classwide arbitration are likely to
be even more substantial in some cases than the interests that are thought
to justify consolidation.' 75
The court discussed factors within a trial court's discretion that should be
considered when determining whether to order classwide arbitration."' It ex-
plained that the focus should be on the alternatives to ordering classwide arbitra-
tion. 177 If the alternative is that hundreds will be forced to proceed through indi-
vidual arbitrations, then classwide arbitration should be chosen.' 78 If gross unfair-
ness is the alternative to ordering classwide arbitration, then it is justified.179 The
court ended by admitting there is a greater need for court involvement in class-
wide arbitration than in individual arbitrations; therefore, courts must consider all
of the factors relevant to typical class actions as well as the special characteristics
of arbitration proceedings.'
80
The court considered the federal appellate court's approach to cases where the
agreement is silent regarding classwide arbitration. 8' Primarily, two cases were
discussed-Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc. 182 and New England Energy Inc., v.
Keystone Shipping Co.' 83 In Champ, the Seventh Circuit adopted the reasoning of
other circuits that classwide arbitration should not be ordered if the court was
effectively reading a new term into an otherwise silent agreement. 84 The main
175. Id. at 786.
176. Id. at 786-87.
177. Id. at 786.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. id. at 787.
181. Id. at 788. Federal courts overwhelmingly disagree with allowing classwide arbitration where
the agreement does not explicitly provide such options. Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d
366, 377 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000); Deiulemar Compagnia Di Navigazione S.p.A. v. MN Allegra, 198 F.3d
473, 481-82 (4th Cir. 1999); Iowa Grain Co. v. Brown, 171 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1999); Sims v.
Unicor Mortgage, Inc., No. 4: 98CV25-D-B, 1998 WL 34016832, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 27, 1998);
Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 665 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); McCarthy
v. Providential Corp., No. C94-0627, 1994 WL 387852, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1994). See Andrea
Lockridge, Note, The Silent Treatment: Removing the Class Action from the Plaintiffs Toolbox With-
out Ever Saying a Word, 2003 J. Disp. RESOL. 255 (stating that courts do not allow classwide arbitra-
tion where the agreement does not specifically allow such an option).
182. 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995).
183. 855 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1988).
184. Champ, 55 F.3d at 274-77. The court stated:
The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that absent an express
provision in the parties' arbitration agreement, the duty to rigorously enforce arbitration agree-
ments "in accordance with the terms thereof' a set forth in section 4 of the FAA bars district
courts from applying Rule 42(a) to require consolidated arbitration, even where consolidation
would promote the expeditious resolution of related claims. (citing, Gov't of U.K. v. Boeing Co.,
998 F.2d 68, 74 (2nd Cir. 1993); Am. Centennial Ins. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th
Cir. 1991); Baesler v. Cont'l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990); Protective Life Ins.
Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (11 th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Del E.
Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1987); Weyerhauser Co. v.
W. Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1984).
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contention the Seventh Circuit had with classwide arbitration where the parties did
not explicitly agree, was that arbitration does not occur in a court of law and Fed-
eral Rule of Procedure 23 only applies to judicial proceedings.' 8 5 Moreover, the
federal rule sanctioning class actions is one of the "niceties" abandoned when the
parties agreed to arbitration.'
86
In New England Energy, the First Circuit analyzed consolidation rather than
classwide arbitration.' 87 Regardless, the California court preferred its analysis.
88
The New England Energy court found that the FAA did not preempt all state law
on arbitration, rather it preempts only state law that directly conflicts.' 89 The court
did not consider an order consolidating arbitrations as conflicting when the order
merely requires a different form of arbitration rather than no arbitration.190
In Blue Cross, the California appellate court cited its state supreme court
which held that the procedural provisions of the FAA are inapplicable if state
procedures are consistent with the "rights granted by Congress."' 9 ' The court did
this while showing why sections 3 and 4 of the FAA do not apply to state courts.
Specifically, the court stated that "a state procedure that serves to further, rather
than defeat, 'full and uniform effectuation of the federal law's objectives'-to
ensure that arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms-is to be
followed in California, rather than section 4 of the act."'
' 92
The court next looked to the U.S. Supreme Court for indirect support via Volt
Information Sciences v. Leland Standard Jr. University. 193 If the parties agreed to
be bound by the law of California, the court argued that Volt offered support for
their decision.' 94 "There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain
set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability,
according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate."', 95 Moreover, in Volt
the Supreme Court praised California for legislating consolidation into arbitration
which cures contradictory outcomes from the many arbitral proceedings that occur
instead of fewer consolidation proceedings. 96  Before concluding, the court
avoided the question of the parties' intention regarding classwide arbitration.1
97
185. Id. at 275-77.
186. Id. at 276.
187. New England Energy, 855 F.2d at 3-5.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Blue Cross of Ca. v. Super. Ct., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). The court
stated:
There is no attempt here to divert a case from arbitration to court. Massachusetts seeks only to
make more efficient the process of arbitrating. Although the Supreme Court has held that agree-
ments to arbitrate must be enforced "even if the result is 'piecemeal' litigation," the Court also
has recognized the Act's endorsement of "speedy and efficient decisionmaking." We fail to see
why a state should be prevented from enhancing the efficiency of the arbitral process, so long as
the state procedure does not directly conflict with a contractual provision.
Id.
191. Id. at 792.
192. Id. at 791 (citations omitted).
193. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
194. Blue Cross of Ca., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792.
195. Id. (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 476).
196. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the FAA is without provisions for dealing with:
[T]he special practical problems that arise in multiparty contractual disputes when some or all of
the contracts at issue include agreements to arbitrate. California has taken the lead in fashioning
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According to this court, the Keating rule allowing classwide arbitration via a
silent arbitration agreement "can facilitate the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments by making classwide arbitration available in appropriate cases."' 98 Califor-
nia, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina are the only state courts that agree on this
point. 199 These courts claim that their approach facilitates the intended agree-
ments of the parties, which is perplexing when the vast majority of courts disagree
with such construction. Moreover, it seems odd to tout agreement facilitation
a legislative response to this problem, by giving courts authority to consolidate or stay arbitration
proceedings in these situations in order to minimize the potential for contradictory judgments.
Id. (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 n. 5).
197. Id. at 793. The court stated:
This argument is premature. The only issue before this court is whether the Keating rule is pre-
empted by the act. No order has been entered certifying a class. No order has been entered re-
quiring classwide arbitration. Whether classwide arbitration is appropriate in this matter is a
question left to the trial court's discretion upon consideration of the variety of factors. Moreover,
under Keating, an arbitration agreement that is silent as to classwide arbitration is amenable to
such procedure. Further, there has been no showing that an order compelling classwide arbitra-
tion would conflict with the agreement to proceed under [American Arbitration Association]
rules.
Id. (citations omitted).
198. Id. at 794.
199. California has remained consistent in supporting classwide arbitration. In 2002, a California
state appeals court cited Blue Cross when stating the "well established" practice of ordering classwide
arbitration when the agreement is silent on the subject. Sanders v. Kinko's, Inc., 121 Cal.Rptr. 766,
769 (Cal. App. 2002). In Pennsylvania, the state Supreme Court likewise faced an agreement that
failed to contain an express clause regarding classwide arbitration. Dickler v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 862-63 (Pa. 1991). The court identified three alternate courses the litiga-
tion could follow. Id. at 867. It could order "compelled individual arbitration, class action in a court
of law, or compelled classwide arbitration." Id. The court made its decision in favor of classwide
arbitration stating:
[T]he last choice best serves the dual interest of respecting and advancing contractually agreed
upon arbitration agreements while allowing individuals who believe they have been wronged to
have an economically feasible route to get injunctive relief from large institutions employing ad-
hesion contracts. The availability of class suits in arbitration proceedings precludes either party
from forcing the other to litigate in a position less advantageous than that for which they con-
tracted. Allowing the suit to proceed through the court would defeat the purpose of the arbitra-
tion agreement, allowing plaintiffs to escape obligated arbitration in order to be heard in the
sympathetic province of a jury trial. Future litigants might feel encouraged to join classes to-
gether for this single purpose when they otherwise would have been satisfied with individually
litigating their claim.
Compelling individual arbitration would force individuals already straitjacket by an industry-
wide practice of arbitration agreements to fight alleged improprieties at an exorbitant economic
cost. Individual arbitration would be small deterrent to companies certain that few proceedings
will be instituted against them. Because the principles of resjudicata and collateral estoppel are
not applicable to arbitration proceedings, each plaintiff would be forced to fully litigate his com-
plaint.
In conclusion, the Shearson client agreement's plain language allows for an interpretation
which comports with federal and state policies favoring arbitration. These policies dictate broad
arbitral powers, including equitable decrees. As Shearson has contended, this dispute must be
resolved in the manner contracted for by the parties. Fairness mandates, however, that the Dick-
ler Group, bound by adhesion form contracts to arbitration agreements, be able to protect their
interests by proceeding as a class through arbitration. We therefore reverse the trial court and
remand for class certification proceedings. Following this decision, the court must compel arbi-
tration for the class if it has been certified or individually if it has not been certified.
Id. Arbitration agreements in Pennsylvania now contain clauses that specifically prohibit classwide
arbitration. See Lytle v. Citifinancial Servs., 810 A.2d 643 (Pa. 2002). Pennsylvania upholds these
agreements, thereby eliminating classwide arbitration as a litigation option. Id. at 665.
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when similarly situated parties to the disputed arbitration agreement (authors of
the arbitration agreements) unfailingly argue they never intended on an outcome
remotely comparable to what the court fashioned.
V. STATE CONTRACT LAW DEFENSES AGAINST ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS
Section 2 of the FAA provides that an arbitration agreement falling within the
Act's purview will be irrevocable, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." 200 This section reserves a state's power
to invalidate arbitration agreements in the same manner they would invalidate any
contract, a view which is consistent with the intent of the FAA.20 ' While the FAA
will preempt contrary state statutes and public policy defenses that attempt to
invalidate arbitration agreements, state law will govern general contract law de-
fenses to the agreement such as duress, fraud, lack of mutuality, and unconscion-
ability. 20 2 Section 2 of the Act also requires federal courts to apply state substan-
tive contract law when determining if a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, irre-
spective of the federal policy favoring arbitration. 20 3 Despite these provisions of
the FAA, preemption in the area of state contract law has yielded varying results
among lower courts' determinations of whether arbitration is appropriate.
A. Severability ofArbitration Clauses
For courts to decide on the enforceability of an arbitration agreement while
not being compelled to hear the underlying merits of the claim, the U.S. Supreme
Court declared that arbitration clauses are examined separate from their parent
204
contracts. This decision resulted from an interpretation of Section 4 of the
FAA, which states, "The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that
the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is
not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbi-
tration in accordance with the terms of the agreement." 20 5 The notion of "sever-
ability" causes difficulties in challenging arbitration, requiring that claims of
fraud, duress, and other contract defenses must be found in the formation of the
20arbitration agreement. 06 A claim of defect of formation of the parent contract
may not invalidate a contained arbitration clause; the merits of the case will re-
main subject to arbitration.20 7
Despite the Supreme Court's declaration that arbitration clauses are severable
from the contracts in which they are contained, lower courts have struggled with
interpreting this decision. Some courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's
200. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
201. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
202. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (stating that "a party may assert general
contract defenses such as fraud to avoid enforcement of an arbitration agreement").
203. Id.
204. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conkling Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
205. Id. at 403 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).
206. Id. at 403-04.
207. Id. at 404.
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holding as requiring an arbitration clause to meet all state contract law require-
ments to be enforceable, treating the clause as a separate and independent con-
tract.20 8 Other courts interpret Prima Paint to mean merely that courts must de-
cide on enforceability of arbitration first, but that defects in the contract as a
whole can be used in making the initial arbitrability decision. 20 9 The Supreme
Court also failed to distinguish between contracts that are "voidable" by one of the
parties due to defects in inducement, and contracts that are void from inception
due to defects in execution." 0
The Ninth Circuit made a distinction between voidable and void contracts in
Three Valleys Municipal Water District v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc.211 In Three
Valleys, several cities entered into a securities agreement with the defendant and
signed client agreements which contained arbitration clauses.212 Plaintiffs alleged
that the signatory did not have the authority to bind them, and therefore contended
that they never entered into such agreements. 213 Remanding the case for determi-
nation of whether the signatory had authority to bind plaintiffs, the court held that
severability of the clause for separate examination pursuant to Prima Paint only
applies when a party seeks to avoid or rescind a contract already in existence, not
when a party alleges that no contract exists due to formation defects.2t 4 Relying
on previous Ninth Circuit decisions as well as others, the court determined that the
courts must determine the threshold issue of whether or not a contract exists.21
5
The Eighth Circuit's view is consistent with that of the Ninth. In I.S. Joseph
Co., Inc. v. Michigan Sugar Co., the Eighth Circuit held that a court should deter-
mine whether an arbitration clause is enforceable when a party denies existence of
a contract.216 The Third Circuit also expressly found that Prima Paint's severabil-
ity doctrine applies to voidable, but not void, contracts. In Sandvik AB v. Advent
International. Corp., the court drew a line between voidable and void contracts
and stated that no arbitration clause can be enforced when a party alleges that no
contract is in existence. 21 7 State courts have also agreed that severing an arbitra-
tion clause for enforceability was not appropriate when the very existence of the
larger agreement is disputed.218
The Sixth Circuit expressly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's view in Burden
v. Check Into Cash of Kentucky, LLC.2 19 In Burden, plaintiffs entered into loan
agreements with defendants, which involved an exchange of cash for customers'
208. See Iwen v. U.S. W. Direct, 293 Mont. 512 (1999); Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 204
W.Va. 229 (1998); Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 83 Ohio St. 3d 464 (1998).
209. See supra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. a. (1981).
211. 925 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991).
212. Id. at 1137-38.
213. Id. at 1138.
214. Id. at 1140.
215. Id. at 1140-41.
216. 803 F.2d 396, 400 (8th Cir. 1986).
217. 220 F.3d 99, 109 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., Inc., 957 F.2d
851,855 (11 th Cir. 1992).
218. See Ala. Catalog Sales v. Harris, 794 So. 2d 312 (Ala. 2000) (holding that courts, not arbitrators,
must decide whether contracts containing arbitration clauses were void under Small Loan Act);
Heurtebise v. Reliable Bus. Computers, 550 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 1996) (stating that arbitration agree-
ments are unenforceable if not contained within a binding contract).
219. 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2001).
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checks.22 ° Checks were held until the payment due date, at which time they were
cashed for the loan amount including a "service fee," which amounted to usurious
interest rates under Kentucky law.221 The plaintiffs also alleged violations of the
Truth in Lending Act, contending that defendants fraudulently coerced them into
agreeing to the loan agreements which contained arbitration clauses.2 2 2 The dis-
trict court applied the decision in Three Valleys. It found that because allegations
of fraud would render the contract void, the arbitration clause was not severable
and was also void.223 The Sixth Circuit decided that the allegation of fraud in the
inducement was not distinguishable from fraud in the execution, and that to the
extent that the contract challenges did not address the arbitration clause specifi-
cally, they were arbitrable.224 The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving
this area of the law unexplained and open to lack of uniformity among the lower
federal and state courts.
B. Mutuality of Obligations
The contract law defense alleging lack of mutuality is another issue that the
various jurisdictions treat differently. Mutuality of obligations, also referred to as
mutuality of consideration, is the general requirement that contracts must bind
both parties.226 The majority of courts adhere to the Restatement of Contract's
view that mutuality is satisfied if there is consideration as to the whole agreement,
regardless of whether the included arbitration clause itself was one-sided.227
Mutuality is often an issue when an arbitration clause requires one party to
arbitrate all claims, while reserving the other party's ability to litigate in court. In
Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., the Third Circuit held that an arbitration
clause that was one-sided was enforceable despite lack of mutuality.228 The Har-
ris' alleged that Green Tree involved them in a fraudulent home improvement
scheme, and brought suit alleging a number of contract law defenses.229 Green
Tree moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a clause contained within the loan
agreements. 230 The Third Circuit found that the clause was enforceable, and also
denied allegations that the clause was unconscionable merely because the party
220. Id. at 486.
221. Id. at 485-86. The Kentucky Supreme Court had previously declared that check-cashing services
were not exempt from usury laws. White v. Check Holders, Inc., 996 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1999).
222. Burden, 267 F.3d at 486.
223. Id. at 486.
224. Id. at 491. See also Large v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 292 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2002).
225. Burden v. Check into Cash of Kentucky, LLC, 535 U.S. 970 (2002).
226. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4-12, 226 (3d. ed.,
1987).
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1979) ("If the requirement of consideration is
met, there is no additional requirement of ... mutuality of obligation."'). See Harris v. Green Tree
Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999); Barker v. Golf U.S.A., Inc., 154 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 1998);
Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d 373, 379 (4th Cir. 1998); Doctor's Assocs. v. Distajo, 66
F.3d 438, 453 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that "[a] doctrine that required separate consideration for arbitra-
tion clauses might risk running afoul" of the federal policy in favor of arbitration); Parker v. Green
Tree Fin. Corp., 730 So.2d 168, 170-71 (Ala. 1999) (rejecting claim that arbitration clause is unen-
forceable due to lack of mutuality of remedy and unconscionability).
228. 183 F.3d at 181.
229. Id. at 176.
230. Id. at 177.
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Despite the prevailing majority view, an increasing number of courts have in-
validated arbitration agreements that lacked mutuality of obligations. In Armen-
dariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., the California Supreme
Court declared that an arbitration clause found within an employment contract
was unenforceable due to unconscionability because the terms were one-sided, but
232the court also mentioned that the terms contravened public policy of the state.
In Anderson v. Ashby, the Alabama Supreme Court struck down a one-sided
arbitration clause as unenforceable.233 The clause required the loan customer to
arbitrate all disputes arising from the transaction or the agreement, but in a sepa-
rate clause, the creditor's right to litigate in a courtroom was retained.3 The
court also chose not to omit this term within the arbitration clause in order to en-
force the agreement, despite the attempts of the clause to provide this option as a
remedy.235  This remedial option was not inconsistent with Alabama statutes,
which give the court the option to remove or limit an unconscionable term in lieu
of invalidation, at its discretion.236 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's decision to strike the entire clause.237 The Arkansas Supreme Court
similarly struck down a clause that left it optional for one of the parties to litigate
or arbitrate.238 It is unclear whether the Arkansas court's decision in Show-
methemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, would be preempted by the FAA,
because the court implied that the mutuality requirement is only applicable to
arbitration clauses.239
Several courts that invalidate arbitration clauses for lack of mutuality do so
by deeming such clauses unconscionable. 240  The Ninth Circuit, in Ticknor v.
Choice Hotels International, Inc., upheld a state court decision invalidating an
231. Id. at 184.
232. 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000).
233. No. 1011740, 2003 WL 21125998 (Ala. May 16, 2003).
234. Id. at *2.
235. The clause stated:
Borrower(s) and Lender agree that if any provision of this arbitration clause is invalid or unen-
forceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, the provision which is found to be invalid or unen-
forceable shall be inapplicable and deemed omitted, but shall not invalidate the remaining provi-
sions of this arbitration clause, and shall not diminish the parties' obligation to arbitrate the dis-
putes subject to this clause.
Id.
236. See AL. STAT. § 7-2-3-2 (2003), which states in pertinent part:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been un-
conscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may en-
force the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the ap-
plication of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id.
237. Anderson, 2003 WL 21125998 at *12.
238. 342 Ark. 112, 121 (2000).
239. Id. at 120. See also Allyson K. Kennett, Note, Showmethemoney Check Cashers. Inc. v. Wil-
liams: Show Me the Mutuality - A New Demand Based on an Old Doctrine Changes the Rules Jbr
Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements in Arkansas, 54 ARK. L. REV. 621, 634 (200 1) (stating that
the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Showmethemoney is a departure from the court's prior
precedent on mutuality and that the mutuality requirement is only applicable to arbitration clauses).
240. See infra notes 240-60 and accompanying text.
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arbitration clause for unconscionability. 241 The clause involved in Ticknor re-
quired the party with lesser bargaining power to arbitrate claims, while allowing
the stronger party to litigate.242 The court noted that while Montana does not in-
validate contracts for lack of mutuality, it could consider mutuality in the uncon-
scionability determination.243 The court ultimately held that the arbitration clause
was unconscionable and unenforceable under Montana state law. 244  The state
court's interpretation of the unconscionability doctrine was not preempted by the
FAA, according to the Ninth Circuit, because it was applicable to all contracts and
did not single out arbitration clauses.2 4 5 It is clear that in some situations, even
though a state may not typically invalidate contracts for lack of mutuality, a lack
of mutuality may still be a factor in defeating arbitration.
246
C. Unconscionability
An issue that is increasingly litigated is the enforceability of arbitration when
the arbitration clause itself is alleged to be unconscionable. The doctrine of un-
conscionability gives courts the discretion to invalidate contracts that cause one of
the parties to be subject to an absence of meaningful choice and unfairly oppres-
sive terms; also known as "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionability, re-
spectively.247 Unconscionability can be a difficult defense to assert, because the
very definition of unconscionability is vague and open for interpretation regarding
the degree of substantive or procedural unconscionability that needs to be present
before a clause will be stricken.248
In Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., the California
Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause within an employment contract was
void based on grounds of unconscionability.249 The court first found that the con-
tract was adhesionary, because it was imposed on employees without the ability to
negotiate terms. 25 0 The clause required employees to arbitrate claims while allow-
241. 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001).
242. Id. at 940. See also Anderson, 2003 WL 21125998 at *9 (holding that an arbitration clause that
required weaker party to arbitrate while reserving power to stronger party to litigate was unconscion-
able and unenforceable).
243. Ticknor, 265 F.3d at 940.
244. Id. at 941.
245. Id. at 942. In determining that federal law did not preempt the decision, the court relied on
Doctor s Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681. 687 (1996).
246. See Ramirez v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 916, 920 (1999) (noting that an agree-
ment that allows the stronger party to litigate while requiring the weaker party to arbitrate is presump-
tively unconscionable).
247. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (2d ed. 1990). See also U.C.C. § 2-302, c. 1.
248. See Potts v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 853 So.2d 194, 205 (Ala. 2000). The court noted that state
law lacks a clear standard for determining unconscionability, and that case law points to several factors
to look to in making this decision:
In addition to finding that one party was unsophisticated and/or uneducated, a court should ask
(1) whether there was an absence of meaningful choice on one party's part, (2) whether the con-
tractual terms are unreasonably favorable to one party, (3) whether there was unequal bargaining
power among the parties, and (4) whether there were oppressive, one-sided, or patently unfair
terms in the contract.
Id
249. 24 Cal. 4th 83, 83 (Cal. 2000)
250. Id. at 114-15.
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ing the employer to litigate, and it limited the recovery of damages by the em-
ployees, without imposing such limitations on the employer.25' The court held
that the term was unconscionably one-sided, and declined to sever the unlawful
portions of the agreement and enforce the remainder. 252 It is interesting to note
that a federal district court within the same jurisdiction did not follow the holding
in Armendariz, although it declined to compel arbitration for other reasons.
2 53
The Ninth Circuit, in Ingle v. Circuit City, declared that an agreement to arbi-
trate entered into by an employer and employee raises a presumption of substan-
tive unconscionability25 4 While a determination of unconscionability generally
requires that both substantive and procedural unconscionability be present, "the
more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforce-
able, and vice versa., 255 The court also suggested that, in a contract of adhesion,
the unconscionable provision should not be severable.256 Therefore, the type of
contract in which the arbitration agreement is integrated could affect a court's
determination of whether substantive unconscionability will be found and whether
the agreement to arbitrate will be unenforceable.
Many courts that find unconscionability within arbitration clauses tend to
place emphasis on the fact that the clauses were found within contracts of adhe-
sion.25 7 At least one federal jurisdiction has determined that adhesion is a defense
that can defeat arbitration in some instances.258 However, many jurisdictions have
stated that an arbitration clause is not rendered unenforceable merely due to being
contained within a standardized agreement that did not involve negotiation. 59
In Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., Inc., the Eighth Circuit held that even though
parties had agreed to arbitrate according to the laws of Missouri, federal law none-
theless preempted the arbitration agreement because the contract dealt with inter-
state commerce and fell within the jurisdiction of the FAA. 260  The court also
rejected a claim that the clause was invalid due to being contained in a contract of
adhesion, stating, "The use of a standard form contract between two parties of
admittedly unequal bargaining power does not invalidate an otherwise valid con-
tractual provision. 26' To be invalid, the provision at issue must be unconscion-
251. id. at 115-16, 121.
252. Id. at 126.
253. See Circuit City Stores v. Banyasz, 2001 WL 1218406, *3-4 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
254. 328 F.3d 1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003). "Substantive unconscionability centers on the 'terms of the
agreement and whether those terms are so one-sided as to shock the conscience."' Id. at 1I 72 (quoting
Kinney v. United Health Care Servs., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 353 (Cal. App. 1999)).
255. Id. at 1171. The federal court looked to the California Supreme Court's decision in Armendariz,
99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745.
256. Id. at 1180.
257. A contract of adhesion is a "standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the
party in a weaker position, usually a consumer, who has little choice about the terms." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 319-20 (7th ed. 1999).
258. See Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Intern., Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001).
259. See Faber v. Menard, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 961, 974 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Webb. v. R. Rowland &
Co., Inc., 800 F.2d. 803, 807 (8th Cir. 1986); Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 542 S.E.2d 360, 365
(S.C. 2001); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 247, at § 4.28 ("[T]he fact that the contract is one of
adhesion is not, of itself, generally regarded as fatal.").
260. 800 F.2d at 807. See 9 U.S.C. § I.
261. Webb, 800 F.2d at 807.
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able. 262 The clause was held not unconscionable simply due to lack of bargain-
ing power or inability to negotiate terms.
2 63
In Faber v. Menard, Inc., an Iowa appellate court determined that the FAA
preempted a state statute that attempted to exclude arbitration clauses from gen-
eral enforceability if they were contained in an adhesion contract.2 64 The court
held that federal law preempted the Iowa statute because the FAA does not ex-
clude arbitration agreements merely for being contained in contracts of adhe-
sion.265 The court noted that the plaintiff was still able to assert general contract
defenses such as unconscionability, but declared that the clause was not uncon-
scionable merely due to the fact that it was contained in an adhesion contract.
2 66
The majority of courts adhere to the notion that adhesionary contracts alone are
not enough to invalidate an arbitration clause, or to cause it to be presumptively
unconscionable.267 However, one commenter noted, "[W]hile the Supreme Court
pursues its largely pro-arbitration course, lower courts seem ripe for change. 268
D. Conclusion
Due to the powerful preemptive effect of the FAA, challengers to arbitration
may be limited to state contract law attacks on the agreement's validity, an area
not superseded by federal law. There remains much confusion in this area. This
is due in part to the vague definitions of many contract defenses and the various
methods of application. State courts may be trying to retain their public policy
arguments against arbitration in a manner not subject to preemption. On the other
hand, while federal courts are supposed to faithfully apply state contract law as
closely as possible to ensure that state's rights are not discriminated against in
federal forums, they tend to mix their evaluations of arbitration clauses with a
healthy dose of the strong federal policy in favor of such agreements.2 69  Even
threshold issues such as severability of arbitration clauses for examination can
pose a problem for parties attempting to navigate the quagmire of current arbitra-
tion law. Until there is a clear federal declaration regarding these issues, those
that are concerned with arbitration should be cautious and thoroughly research the
trends within the specific jurisdictions in which they practice.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. 267 F. Supp. 2d at 973.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 274.
267. See supra Part V.C.
268. Linde Alle-Murphy, Are Compulsory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts Enforceable?
A Contractual Analysis, 75 TEMPLE L. REV. 125, 159 (Spring 2002). Another commenter wondered
"if the historical hostility to arbitration will be carried forward under the guise of waiver and uncon-
scionability." Johnson, supra note 76, at 614.
269. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987) (noting that "[c]ourt[s] may not, then, in assess-
ing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner
different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state law"). How-
ever, despite this declaration and the fact that parties had agreed to arbitrate under state law, the Su-
preme Court held that the FAA preempted the state law decision, and that the arbitration agreement
was enforceable. Id. at 492-93.
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VI. PREEMPTION, ARBITRATION, AND FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS
A. Introduction to Franchise Agreements and Arbitration Clauses
After examining how courts have treated FAA preemption with respect to
certain legal doctrines and procedural issues, this section analyzes FAA preemp-
tion with respect to particular practice areas. Franchise agreements seem to be
quite common in arbitration case law, and from this area, one can analyze FAA
preemption through a different lens. This section will first give the legal founda-
tion for FAA preemption in the franchise context and then will specifically focus
on the validity of arbitration provisions, forum selection clauses. It will also touch
briefly on attorneys' fees.
B. The Legal Foundation for Preemption in the Franchise Context
The leading case with regard to preemption and franchise agreements is
Southland Corp. v. Keating.270 The statute at issue was the California Franchise
Investment Law (FIL). 271 The FIL provided that "[alny condition, stipulation or
provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compli-
ance with any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void. 272
Although this statute did not specifically refer to arbitration, the California Su-
preme Court interpreted this statute to require judicial determination of claims
"brought under the State statute and accordingly refused to enforce the parties'
contract to arbitrate such claims." 273 The Court, in Southland, reiterated the oft-
repeated purpose of the FAA, to "declare[] a national policy favoring arbitration
and withdr[awing] the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the reso-
lution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.274
The Court then quoted from section 2 of the FAA, which states that
A written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction involv-
ing commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an exist-
ing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.275
The Court found that the FIL was preempted by the FAA, and therefore, was
invalid under the Supremacy Clause.276 In a footnote, the Court responded to
Justice Stevens' dissent, which emphasized the clause in section 2 of the FAA that
allows a party to avoid an arbitration clause on "such grounds as exist at law or in
270. 465 U.S. I (1984).
271. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977).
272. Id.
273. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
274. id.
275. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976)) (emphasis added).
276. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
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equity for the revocation of any contract." 277 In this footnote, the Court agreed
"that a party may assert general contract defenses such as fraud to avoid enforce-
ment of an arbitration agreement." 278 Yet, the Court concluded "that the defense
to arbitration found in the [FIL] is not a ground that exists at law or in equity 'for
the revocation of any contract' but merely a ground that exists for the revocation
of arbitration provisions in contracts subject to the [FIL]. 279 In this bit of dicta,
the Court highlighted the fact that the only defenses to nullify an arbitration provi-
sion were those defenses that were applicable to all contracts, not just those re-
garding arbitration or those involving a certain area of the law (e.g. franchise
agreements).
Since Southland, there have been many lower court decisions that have struck
down state statutes in the franchise context as being preempted by the FAA. The
cases can be broken down into three general categories, including state statutes
regarding (1) the validity of franchise agreement arbitration clauses, (2) forum
selection clauses in franchise agreement arbitration provisions, and (3) attorneys
fees in franchise agreement arbitration provisions.
C. Validity of Franchise Agreement Arbitration Clauses
In Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Paramount Saturn, Ltd.,8 ° the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Texas Motor Vehicle Board (TMVB) did "not have
exclusive jurisdiction over contractual disputes between franchisors and franchi-
sees in the motor vehicle industry." 281 Moreover, the court noted that even if the
TMVB did have exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes, the FAA would pre-
empt such a restraint on arbitration.282
In Cornhusker International Trucks, Inc. v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc.,283 the
Nebraska Supreme Court held the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act that was
amended in 1997 was preempted by the FAA.284 The Nebraska law provided an
exception to the validity of arbitration provisions when the provision was between
parties that were covered under the Nebraska motor vehicle industry licensing
statutes. 285 The court in Cornhusker, relying on Southland, found "that the FAA
preempts Nebraska law which conflicts with the FAA . . . and [there are] no
grounds at law or in equity for its revocation.,
286
In Alabama,287 the Alabama Motor Vehicle Franchise Act prohibited binding
arbitration.288 In Bondy's Ford, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp.,289 the United States
277. Id. at 16 n.I I(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Paramount Saturn, Ltd., 326 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 2003).
281. Id. at 687.
282. Id.
283. 637 N.W.2d 876 (Neb. 2002).
284. Id. at 883.
285. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2602.01 and 60-1401.01, et seq. (2002)
286. Cornhusker, 637 N.W.2d at 883-84.
287. Alabama has been one of the states that treats arbitration harshly. See 1975 ALA. CODE § 8-1 -
41(3) (stating that an agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration cannot be specifically enforced).
288. 1975 ALA. CODE § 8-20-4(3)(m).
289. 147 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
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District Court for the Middle District of Alabama held that the Alabama statute
was preempted by the FAA. 290 The party seeking to avoid arbitration argued that
an exception to the FAA was carved out by Congress when it enacted the Dealer's
Day in Court Act (DDCA).291 The court in Bondy's Ford, acknowledged that
there may be "legal constraints external to the parties' agreement that foreclose
the arbitration of . . .claims," 292 but held that the DDCA was not such a legal
constraint. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that "[t]he DDCA enables
automobile dealers to bring suit against manufacturers for 'failure . . .to act in
good faith in performing or complying with any of the terms or provisions of the
franchise, or in terminating, canceling, or not renewing the franchise with said
dealer."' 293 The court found that although a federal right and federal cause of
action were created, this did not carve out an exception to the FAA. 294 The lan-
guage of the DDCA is permissive, not mandatory, and thus only opens district
courts to plaintiffs, but does not close the door to arbitration.
295
The party seeking to avoid arbitration also made an argument that the arbitra-
tion provision in the franchise agreement could not be enforced because it was
unconscionable. 296 The court did acknowledge that an unconscionability defense
was a valid defense to the enforcement of arbitration provisions under the FAA
and that Alabama law "permit[ed] a court to refuse to enforce any contract that is
unconscionable." 297 Still, the court found that the party claiming unconscionabil-
ity did not satisfy the element of being unreasonable, given any reasonable
choice.298 The court concluded by stating that the unconscionability argument
was "without merit and clearly falls far short of what is required to show that an
agreement is unconscionable. 299
In Equipment Manufacturers Institute v. Janklow,30 0 a South Dakota statute,
the Dealership Act, "prevent[ed] a manufacturer from conditioning the offer,
grant, or renewal of a dealership contract on a dealer's agreement to the inclusion
of a binding arbitration clause." 301 The court noted, "The Dealership Act does not
prevent the parties from including such an arbitration clause, as long as the manu-
facturer does not insist upon it as a condition to the offer, grant, or renewal of the
dealership contract. 3 °2 Although that franchisees and franchisors could freely
enter into arbitration and the Dealership Act did not prohibit arbitration in fran-
chise agreements, the court found that the Dealership Act was preempted by the
FAA because "the Act still places arbitration clauses on an unequal footing, by
290. Id. at 1287.
291. Id. at 1286. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25.
292. Bondys Ford, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
293. Id. (quoting the DDCA).
294. Id. at 1287.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1291.
297. Id. See also 1975 ALA. CODE § 7-2-302 (on unconscionability in contracts and contract clauses).
298. BondysFord, 147 F. Supp. 2d. at 1292.
299. Id.
300. Equip. Mfrs. Inst. v. Janklow, 136 F. Supp. 2d 991 (D.S.D. 2001), aff'd in part and rev"d on
other grounds, 300 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2002).
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refusing to enforce them along with other terms to which the parties mutually
agree before a dispute arises.,
30 3
In New Jersey, the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act (NJFPA) provided
that:
(a) It shall be a violation of the Franchise Practices Act ... for a motor
vehicle franchisee to agree to a term or condition in a franchise ... as a
condition to the offer, grant or renewal of the franchise ... which:
(3) Requires that disputes between the motor vehicle franchisor and
motor vehicle franchisee to be submitted to arbitration or to any
other binding alternate dispute resolution procedure; provided, how-
ever, that any franchise ... may authorize the submission of a dis-
pute to arbitration ... if the motor vehicle franchisor and motor ve-
hicle franchisee voluntarily agree to submit the dispute to arbitration
.. at the time the dispute arises.304
The court in Central Jersey Freightliner, Inc. v. Freightliner Corp.30 5 found
that there was a "clear conflict between the FAA and the NJFPA."30 6 The court
noted, "While the New Jersey statute does not operate as a wholesale proscription
of arbitration clauses in franchise agreements and creates only a presumption of
invalidity, the statute clearly limits the enforceability of arbitration clauses by
requiring, at the very least, that a franchisor prove that the franchisee was offered
an identical agreement without the arbitration provision." 30 7 Given this conflict,
the court held that the "NJFPA ... violat[ed] the Supremacy Clause and is pre-
empted by the FAA.,
30 8
Another leading case in the area of FAA preemption of state statutes that in-
validate arbitration provisions in franchise agreements is Doctor's Associates, Inc.
v. Casarotto.a°9 In Casarotto, a Montana statute required that the arbitration
clause be "typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract. 3 10
The Court in Casarotto found "Montana's first-page notice requirement, which
governs not 'any contract,' but specifically and solely contracts 'subject to arbitra-
tion,' conflicts with the FAA and is therefore displaced by the federal measure."
3
'
Because the Montana law placed arbitration agreements in a separate class and
limited only their validity, the statute was inconsistent with the FAA, and there-
fore, preempted.31 2
In Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams,3 13 a Virginia statute prohibited
"automobile manufacturers and dealers from entering into agreements that contain
303. Id.
304. N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:10-7.3 (West 2001).
305. Cent. Jersey Freightliner, Inc. v. Freightliner Corp., 987 F. Supp. 289 (D.N.J. 1997).
306. Id. at 300.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
310. Id. at 683 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)).
311. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 683.
312. Id. at 688.
313. Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1990).
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mandatory alternative dispute resolution provisions." 314 In Williams, the court
held that the state statute was preempted by the FAA because "Virginia law gen-
erally permit[ted] contracting parties to make terms nonnegotiable, and singles out
arbitration provisions as an exception to that rule."31 5 While holding that the Vir-
ginia statute was preempted by the FAA, the court discussed to which law the
statute in question should be compared. The court declared:
In determining whether the Virginia statute impermissibly burdens arbi-
tration provisions, it must be compared to general contract law rather
than to laws which apply only to contracts subject to the Motor Vehicle
Licensing Act, or to miscellaneous statutes which prohibit a narrow as-
sortment of unrelated contractual terms because they violate public pol-
icy.3
16
In Seymour v. Gloria Jean's Coffee Bean Franchise Corp.,3 17 the District
Court of Minnesota held that the FAA preempted the Minnesota Franchise Act,
which prohibited predispute agreements to arbitrate. 3 8 The party seeking to avoid
arbitration in this case also argued that the arbitration agreement lacked mutuality
of obligation, and therefore, the party was not bound by the agreement. 319 The
court rejected this argument, stating "The agreement as a whole does not lack
consideration, nor does the agreement in its entirety lack mutuality. The Court
finds nothing in the mutuality doctrine which should bar enforcement of the arbi-
tration agreement.
'32 0
The final case discussed here with respect to the validity of franchise arbitra-
tion agreements is Scanlon v. P & J Enterprises, Inc.321 In Scanlon, the franchi-
sees sued the franchisor for various claims, including breach of contract, fraud,
negligence, and tortuous interference with a business relationship. 322 The franchi-
sees sought to avoid arbitration and claimed that the underlying claim was fraud in
the inducement of the franchise contract, and therefore, they were absolved of
having to arbitrate. 323 The court in Scanlon disagreed with that contention and
found that the parties were required to arbitrate.
324
D. Forum Selection Clauses in Franchise Agreement Arbitration
Provisions
Forum selection clauses in arbitration provisions of franchise agreements
have consistently been upheld and state statutes that prohibit or restrict choosing a
forum for arbitration have been preempted by the FAA. The most recent case
314. Id. at 721 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-550.5:24 (Supp. 1989)).
315. Id. at 724.
316. Id. at 725 (emphasis in original).
317. Seymour v. Gloria Jean's Coffee Bean Franchising Corp., 732 F. Supp. 988 (D. Minn. 1990).
318. Id. at 994.
319. See id. at 995 (citing Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d (11 th Cir. 1985).
320. Id. at 996.
321. Scanlon v. P & J Enter., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 616 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
322. Id. at 617.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 618.
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holding that a statute restricting forum selection clauses was preempted by the
FAA is Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc.325 In Bradley, the California Franchise
Relations Act provided that "A provision in a franchise agreement restricting
venue to a forum outside [California] is void with respect to any claim arising
under or relating to a franchise agreement involving a franchise business operating
within this state." 326 The party seeking to avoid arbitration "contend[ed] that §
20040.5 [was] not preempted by the FAA because it treat[ed] arbitration and liti-
gation equally and [did] not single out arbitration as a disfavored form of dispute
resolution." 327 The court rejected this argument and stated, "Section 40040.5
applies only to forum selection clauses and only to franchise agreements; it there-
fore does not apply to 'any contract."' 328 Further, the court held that the Califor-
nia statute was preempted by the FAA because it did not apply equally to all con-
tracts.
329
Similarly, in Flint Warm Air Supply Co., Inc. v. York International Corp., a
federal district court in Michigan held that the Michigan Franchise Investment
Law was preempted by the FAA.330 The Michigan statute provided:
Each of the following provisions is void and unenforceable if contained
in any document relating to a franchise .... A provision requiring that
arbitration or litigation be conducted outside this state. This shall not
preclude the franchisee from entering into an agreement, at the time of
arbitration, to conduct arbitration at a location outside this state.
331
The court in Flint held that the Michigan statute was preempted by the FAA
because the statute "impose[d] limitations on the method and manner by which the
parties agreed to arbitrate their disputes, . . . [and] the state statute placed greater
restrictions on arbitration agreements than on other contracts." 332 For the same
reasons posited in Bradley, the court in Flint found the restriction on choice of
forum clauses in franchise arbitration provisions to be preempted by the FAA.
Another similar case, this time involving the Rhode Island Franchise Invest-
ment Act,333 is KKW Enterprises, Inc. v. Gloria Jean's Gourmet Coffees Franchis-
ing Corp.334 The Rhode Island statute provided that, "A provision in a franchise
agreement restricting jurisdiction or venue to a forum outside this state or requir-
ing the application of the laws of another state is void with respect to a claim oth-
erwise enforceable under this act., 335 Although the statute did not explicitly sin-
gle out arbitration, the court in KKW held that the statute was preempted by the
FAA. The court explained:
325. Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 2001).
326. Id. at 888 (quoting CA. Bus. & PROF. § 20040.5 (1997)).
327. Id. at 889.
328. Id. at 890.
329. Id.
330. Flint Warm Air Supply Co. v. York Int'l Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d 820, 827 (D. Mich. 2000).
331. Id. at 824 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1527(f) (1999)).
332. Flint, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
333. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28.1-14 (1999).
334. KKW Enters., Inc. v. Gloria Jean's Gourmet Coffee Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d 42 (1st Cir.
1999).
335. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28.1-14 (1999).
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Because this proscription limits the statute's application to one type of
provision, venue clauses, in one type of agreement, franchise agreements,
the statute does not apply to any contract. Simply stated, because § 19-
28.1-14 is not a generally applicable contract defense, it is, if applied to
arbitration agreements, preempted by § 2 of the FAA.336
In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Hamilton,337 the Second Circuit "preempted'
the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Kubis & Perszyk Associates, Inc. v.
Sun Microsystems, Inc.33 8 The party seeking to avoid arbitration relied on Kubis
to defend its position that "a forum selection clause in a franchise agreement
which designated an out-of-state judicial forum was presumptively invalid under
the state's franchise protection act." 339 Although Kubis related to judicial forums,
the court in Hamilton held that "to the extent that Kubis can be read to invalidate
arbitral forum selection clauses in franchise agreements, it is preempted by the
FAA., 340 Although Hamilton could have easily been distinguished from Kubis,
therefore disregarding the need to explicitly preempt, the Second Circuit took
advantage of the opportunity to find that the New Jersey law would not be ex-
panded as to be applicable to arbitration.
The final case discussing choice of law clauses in franchise arbitration
agreements is Alphagraphics Franchising, Inc. v. Whaler Graphics, Inc.34 1 The
court in Alphagraphics found that the Michigan Franchise Investment Law was
preempted.342 The Michigan statute provided that a "provision requiring that arbi-
tration or litigation be conducted outside this state [was void]. 343 The court held
because "the state statute placed greater restrictions on arbitration agreements than
on other contracts [it ... was preempted by the FAA]." 34 However, the decision
in Alphagraphics is somewhat different than the previously described cases, su-
pra, in that the court in Alphagraphics found that the agreement to a choice of law
clause in the arbitration agreement was procured by fraud, and because fraud is
applicable to all contracts, it is not preempted by the FAA.345 Thus, although the
parties were required to arbitrate their claims, the arbitration was to take place in
Michigan, and not Arizona where the choice of law clauses provided.346
E. Attorneys Fees in Franchise Agreement Arbitration Provisions
The final area of exploration of preemption and arbitration provisions in fran-
chise agreements is with respect to attorneys' fees. The leading case on preemp-
tion and attorneys' fees is Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc.347 In
336. KKW Enterprises, 184 F.3d at 51.
337. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1998).
338. 680 A.2d 618 (N.J. 1996).
339. Hamilton, 150 F.3d at 162.
340. Id. at 163.
341. Alphagraphics Franchising, Inc. v. Whaler Graphics, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 708 (D. Ariz. 1993).
342. Id. at 710.
343. Id. at 709 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1527(0 (1999)).
344. Id. at 710.
345. Id. at 711.
346. Id. at 711-12.
347. Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941 (Utah 1996).
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Buzas, the arbitration panel found for the Trappers, finding that Buzas Baseball
had not complied with the procedures for drafting a lower classification team's
territory. 348 On appeal, Buzas Baseball argued that the Trappers were not permit-
ted to collect reasonable attorneys' fees because the FAA does "not explicitly
provide for attorney fees., 34 9 The Utah Arbitration Act did provide for reasonable
attorneys' fees, 350 but Buzas argued that the Utah Arbitration Act was preempted
by the FAA.35 ' The Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument and found that
the Utah Act was not preempted as to attorney fees.352 The court, relying on Volt,
found that awarding attorneys' fees did not conflict with the federal policy of
placing arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts" and to
"overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbi-
trate. 353 The Utah Supreme Court also compared the Utah Act with the Uniform
Arbitration Act (UAA)354 and found that the Uniform Act had been held by many
jurisdictions to allow for awarding attorneys' fees and that the Utah Act was con-
sistent with the Uniform Act.355 Finally, the court analyzed the policies underly-
ing awarding attorneys' fees, and found those to be consistent with the FAA.
356
F. Conclusion
From this survey of FAA preemption in the franchise agreement context, one
can see that courts have routinely stuck to the Supreme Court's language that
promotes arbitration and lower courts have extended the concept of treating arbi-
tration equally with all other contracts so that almost no state statute or state court
decision striking the validity or forum selection clause of an arbitration agreement
will withstand FAA preemption. It is interesting to note however that courts are
not just blindly preempting state statutes dealing with arbitration, but they are
looking at furthering the underlying policies, as is the case with awarding attor-
neys' fees.
VII. FAA PREEMPTION AND THE REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
A. How was the Uniform Arbitration Act "Revised"?
The prime objective of the revision to the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) is
to continue to promote arbitration as a desirable alternative to litigation by making
348. Id. at 945.
349. Id. at 952.
350. Id. The Utah Arbitration Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31a-1 to 78-31a-20, was repealed May
15, 2003.
351. Buzas, 925 P.2d at 952.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. UAA § 1 (1997).
355. Buzas, 925 P.2d at 952-53.
356. Id. at 953.
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the arbitration process efficient, expeditious, economical, fair to the parties, and
final.357
The revisions to the UAA address the following issues:
3 58
I. Which forum (arbitrator or court) decides arbitrability of a dispute and
by what criteria. Courts are limited to deciding whether an agreement to
arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate. 359
The arbitrator, on the other hand, is responsible for deciding whether an
agreement to arbitrate exists and whether a contract containing a valid
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.
360
2. Which forum orders provisional remedies such as attachments, re-
straining orders, etc. A court is responsible for entering orders for provi-
sional remedies before an arbitrator is appointed.361 After an arbitrator is
appointed, the arbitrator may issue such remedies, and the parties only
have recourse to the courts for such remedies in urgent matters, where the
362arbitrator is not acting timely or cannot provide an adequate remedy.
3. The process for initiating arbitration. The Revised Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act requires notice in the manner agreed to by the parties, and, in the
absence of an agreement, provides a gap-filler-notice shall be given by
certified or registered mail, or by service for a civil action, and must de-
scribe the nature of the controversy and the remedy sought.
363
4. Authority to consolidate arbitrations. If not prohibited by the agree-
ment of the parties, the court may order consolidation of some or all
claims if the parties, claims, or issues are similar, or if prejudice would
result from failure to consolidate.364
5. Requiring arbitrators to disclose facts which may affect impartiality.
Arbitrators must disclose financial or personal interests in the outcome of
the arbitration and relationships with the parties to the agreement to arbi-
trate or other persons involved in the arbitration proceeding.
365
6. Provisions for immunity of arbitrators and arbitration organizations.
Arbitrators and arbitration organizations have immunity to the same ex-
tent as a judge acting in judicial capacity. 366
357. See REV. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT Policy Statement I, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/arbps0500.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003) [hereinafter
RUAA, Policy Statement].
358. See id.
359. UAA § 6(b), 7 U.L.A. I (rev. 2000 Supp. 2003).
360. Id. § 6(c).
361. Id. § 8(a).
362. Id. § 8(b).
363. Id. § 9(a).
364. Id. § 10.
365. Id. § 12.
366. Id. § 14(a).
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7. Whether arbitrators can be required to testify in other proceedings.
Arbitrators or representatives of arbitration organizations are only com-
petent to testify to the extent necessary to determine a claim against a
party or in a hearing to vacate an award if prima facie evidence for vaca-
tur exists.
36 7
8. Discretion of arbitrators to order discovery, issue protective orders,
decide motions for summary dispositions, hold prehearing conferences,
and otherwise manage the arbitration process. An arbitrator may conduct
arbitration in a manner appropriate for a fair and expeditious disposition
of the proceeding.368
9. Provisions for courts to enforce pre-award rulings by the arbitrator.
Parties may request the arbitrator to incorporate pre-award rulings into
the award, which courts will confirm by issuing an order.369
10. Defining arbitration remedies including provisions for attorney's
fees, punitive damages and other exemplary relief. Arbitrators may
award such relief if authorized by law in a civil action involving the same
claim.
370
11. Specifying which sections of RUAA are not waivable or those that
cannot be restricted unreasonably. This provision is designed to ensure
basic fairness, particularly in adhesion contracts where one party has lit-
tle or no bargaining power to modify the terms of the agreement.37'
12. Provisions for enforcing subpoenas to witnesses who reside in states
other than the arbitration state. Arbitration subpoenas are to be handled
372in the same manner as subpoenas in a civil action in the adopting state.
13. Providing for vacatur when arbitrators fail to disclose facts which
could reasonably affect impartiality373 or the arbitrator displayed evident
partiality, corruption, or prejudicial misconduct. 374
14. Standards for giving and receiving notice in arbitration proceedings.
Notice may be given by taking any action reasonably necessary to inform
the other party; notice is received if the recipient has or should have
367. Id. § 14(d).
368. Id. § 15(a).
369. Id. § 18.
370. Id. § 21.
371. Id. § 4.
372. Id. § 17.
373. Id. § 12.
374. Id. § 23(a)(2).
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knowledge of it, or the notice is addressed to the recipient at his place of
residence or business.375
Procedural aspects that are new to the Act are definitions to allow traditional
terms such as "record" to function in e-arbitration 376 and a provision defining the
effective date for application of the Act (the Revised Act is not retroactive).377
As of September 21, 2003, eight states had adopted the RUAA, updating their
arbitration laws to reflect developments in the field since the original UAA was
written in 1956.378 The adopting states are: Hawaii, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Nevada, Oregon and Utah.379
B. How Does the RUAA Deal with FAA Preemption?
The U.S. Supreme Court has taken a strong pro-arbitration stance in cases de-
cided under the FAA in the past two decades.3 8 0 The Court has held that the FAA
usually preempts state law that runs contrary to these federal pro-arbitration poli-
cies. 38' However, state arbitration laws are still relevant, both in cases where the
parties choose to be bound by the arbitration law of a particular state and where
state arbitration laws are consistent with the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration posi-
tion.382 Of course, state arbitration statutes must be careful not to regulate agree-
ments different than other contracts-such statutes are subject to federal preemp-
tion. 3  Because both the UAA and the RUAA have the goal of promoting the
arbitration process, they are not preempted by the FAA. As one judge plainly
stated, "[C]ourts have decided numerous cases under the UAA and should con-
tinue to do so with state adoptions of the RUAA. 384 The two key issues that the
Supreme Court's preemption-related opinions have centered upon are enforcement
of the agreement to arbitrate and issues of substantive arbitrability. 38 5  In order to
reassure states desiring to adopt the RUAA that federal preemption would not be a
375. Id. § 2.
376. Also known as Online Dispute Resolution, e-arbitration is not a new form of dispute resolution,
but rather a tool to allow the arbitrator and the parties to conduct the arbitration over the internet. For
example, see the services offered at E-Arbitration-T, at http://www.e-arbitration-t.com (last visited
Nov. 10, 2003), and SquareTrade, offering online dispute resolution for E-bay, online auctions, at
http://www.squaretrade.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
377. See Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing, Revising, and
Clarifying Arbitration, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 9-37.
378. See Staff Reporters, North Carolina Governor Signs Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, ADR-
WORLD.COM, at http://www.ADRWorld.com (Aug. 1, 2003).
379. Id. Arbitration websites, such as ADRWorld.com, are excellent sources of up-to-date informa-
tion on the most recent states considering and adopting the RUAA.
380. Heinsz, supra note 377, at 3.
381. Id. at4.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 5.
384. Id. at 5
385. UAA prefatory note, 7 U.L.A. I (rev. 2000 Supp. 2003), citing Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 2 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
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problem under the Revised Act, its drafters kept the strong policy of federal pre-
emption under the FAA as a backdrop to all their discussions.
386
To avoid preemption concerns, the Act's drafters ultimately decided to leave
many potentially preemption-inducing issues to developing case law and federal
legislative action, rather than attempting to fashion a definitive rule.387  This ap-
proach of omission was used for the issue of arbitration agreements in adhesion
contracts.388 Although there are many critics of arbitration agreements in the con-
sumer, employee, and franchisee contexts, the RUAA drafters did not formulate
regulation in those areas in order to "avoid the significant FAA preemption prob-
lems raised by singling out some arbitration agreements for particular treatment
different from other contract law." 389 Another issue the drafters left undeveloped
due to preemption concerns was unconscionability. 390 General state contract law,
rather than a statute specifically geared towards arbitration, is better suited to ad-
dress the issue and less likely to be preempted for singling out arbitration agree-
ments for stricter treatment.
39
'
Finally, the Act's drafters faced disagreement over whether the Revised Act
should address the standards and procedures for vacatur, confirmation and modifi-
cation of arbitration awards.392 The FAA speaks definitively to these standards
and procedures; however, the Supreme Court has not yet spoken directly about
preemptive effect, if any, of the FAA with regard to these issues. 393 Thus, the
RUAA drafters trod lightly when faced with the task of drafting state law provi-
sions relating to these issues. According to the Act's Prefatory Note, it is the
drafters' belief that "the Supreme Court's unequivocal stand to date as to the pre-
emptive effect of the FAA provides strong reason to believe that a similar result
will obtain with regard to Section 10(a) grounds for vacatur." 394 If such a deter-
mination is made, the drafters believe that the "FAA preemption of conflicting
state law with regard to... vacatur (and confirmation and modification) would be
certain.
3 95
One of the most difficult questions the RUAA Drafting Committee wrestled
with regarding federal preemption was "the question of whether the RUAA should
explicitly sanction contractual provisions for 'opt-in' review of challenged arbitra-
tion awards beyond that presently contemplated by the FAA and current state
arbitration acts., 396 There are two types of "opt-in" provisions, depending on the
type of review provided-judicial or arbitral. A judicial opt-in provision provides
an opportunity for judicial review in a designated state court and grants the court
authority to vacate challenged awards, typically for errors of law or fact. 397 Arbi-
tral opt-in provisions create an appellate review procedure within the arbitration
386. Heinsz, supra note 377, at 5.
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system for the challenged awards. Like the judicial review, these awards are also
generally reviewed for errors of law or fact.3"
The drafters who favored authorizing the opt-in provisions in the RUAA be-
lieved that parties to an arbitration agreement should be free to contract for judi-
cial review if they want it.399  Opt-in provisions are a measure of protection
against "bonehead" decisions by an arbitrator.400 Many of the drafters thought
that approving the opt-in provisions under the RUAA would allow more people to
become aware of the possibility of such a review provision.40 1 Finally, the propo-
nents argued, parties would be more likely to use arbitration if a more liberal stan-
dard of review was available, as opposed to the narrow grounds in the UAA or
FAA.
402
Drafters on the other side of the debate, however, held firmly to the idea that
one of arbitration's best features is finality. Allowing for review of awards on the
whim of either party destroys this feature.40 3 Another problem with opt-in review
is the additional procedural requirements 40 4 that would have to be grafted onto the
arbitral process in order to enable a judge or arbitral panel to conduct "meaningful
review" of an arbitrator's decision, erasing the benefits of lower costs and higher
efficiency from arbitration. 405 Some drafters feared that sanctioning opt-in provi-
sions would cause the inclusion of such clauses in arbitration agreements to be-
come common practice.40 6 Finally, the opponents argued, if parties are so distrust-
ful of arbitration that they must have an appeals process, then perhaps those par-
ties are better off going to court.40 7  Opponents to the opt-in provisions also
pointed out that permitting their use would cause a "substantial risk" of federal
preemption of the RUAA, because it would be creating a new ground for vacatur,
408in addition to the four grounds listed in section 10(a) of the FAA.
Since the four U.S. Courts of Appeals40 9 that have taken up the issue have
been evenly split as to the validity of such agreements, and the Supreme Court has
398. Id.
399. See RUAA Policy Statement, supra note 357, at 1 5; Heinz, supra note 377, at 27.
400. Heinsz, supra note 377, at 27.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. See RUAA Policy Statement, supra note 357, at 5; Heinz, supra note 377, at 27-28.
404. Heinsz, supra note 377, at 27-28 (referring to the "record" and written findings of law and fact
by the arbitrator).
405. Id. at 28.
406. See RUAA, Policy Statement, supra note 357, at 1 5arbpsO500.htm.
407. Heinsz, supra note 377, at 28.
408. Id; See also FAA § 10 (a) (2000). The four grounds are:
(I) there are separate agreements to arbitrate or separate arbitration proceedings between the
same persons or one of them is a party to a separate agreement to arbitrate or a separate arbitra-
tion proceeding with a third person; (2) the claims subject to the agreements to arbitrate arise in
substantial part from the transaction or series of related transactions; (3) the existence of common
issue of law or fact creates the possibility of conflicting decisions in the separate arbitration pro-
ceeding; and (4) prejudice resulting from a failure to consolidate is not outweighed by the risk of
undue delay or prejudice to the rights of or hardship to parties opposing consolidation.
FAA § 10 (a) (2000).
409. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have approved the use of opt-in provisions in arbitration agree-
ments. See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997); Gateway Techs., Inc.
v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995). The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have disap-
proved of opt-in provisions. See UHC Management Co. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992
(8th Cir. 1998); Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
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not ruled on this issue, the drafters chose to omit the clause, thus avoiding any
preemption concerns.410 However, as Professor Heinsz points out, exclusion of
this clause from the RUAA neither limits parties' abilities to include such clauses
in jurisdictions that have not disapproved of the practice, nor does it prevent the
less-controversial practice of providing for a form of arbitral review.4 1' Because
arbitral review panels do not "entangle courts in the arbitral decision-making
process," there is no risk of federal preemption under the FAA.412
VIII. CONCLUSION
Originally, the FAA was seen as a body of procedural law that was applicable
only in federal courts.41 3 However, due to several Supreme Court decisions, the
scope of the FAA has increased tremendously. As a result of a handful of cases,
the Supreme Court has explained that the FAA essentially withdraws states'
power to compel judicial resolution of claims when parties have validly contracted
for arbitration.41 4 The powerful preemptive effect of this area of federal law has
caused controversy in recent years, resulting in many advocates, as well as oppo-
nents, to clamor for reform of the methods by which parties enter into or are sub-
jected to arbitration. 41 5 It is fairly clear, especially in the situation of state laws
that directly address arbitration agreements, that the dangers of FAA preemption
are ever-present. As a result, lower courts are forced to use neutral state contract
law to enforce states' public policies against arbitration. In an effort to help states
comply and avoid FAA preemption, the RUAA was drafted, but is still in the early
states of adoption. Because of the current lack of uniformity among the states
regarding arbitration statutes and case law, as well as the diversity of state contract






410. Heinsz, supra note 377, at 29-30; See RUAA Policy Statement, supra note 357, at 5.
411. Heinsz, supra note 377, at 30.
412. Id.
413. MACNEIL, supra note 33.
414. See supra Part Ill.
415. See, e.g., Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court s Erroneous Statu-
tory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789 (2002) (discussing
the history of arbitration and critiquing the three theories of statutory interpretation).
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